The findings from this study have direct implications for practitioners and policy makers. Current legislation efforts separate the auditor from the client and are not effective in raising the client’s perception of professional skepticism. Instead, the authors propose regulators giving auditors and clients sufficient leeway to establish identification-based trust.
Aschauer, Ewald, et al. “Trust and Professional Skepticism in the Relationship between Auditors and Clients: Overcoming the Dichotomy Myth.” Behavioral Research in Accounting 29.1 (2017): 19.
http://commons.aaahq.org/groups/e5075f0eec/summary
Based on previous studies and preconceived notions, the finding that partners expressing their own views about the low likelihood of fraud had no effect on professional skepticism was surprising. This suggest that partner’s concern of not expressing this opinion to the team because it would lower the overall professional skepticism may be unwarranted. The evidence from this study indicates that partners can raise professional skepticism within the team by communicating management’s view of low likelihood of fraud, however it is not recommended for partners to use this approach every single time. Also, encouraging both outward and internal skeptical orientation can raise professional skepticism as well.
Harding, N, and K. T. Trotman. 2017. The Effect of Partner Communications of Fraud Likelihood and Skeptical Orientation on Auditors’ Professional Skepticism. Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (21): 111-131.
http://commons.aaahq.org/groups/e5075f0eec/summary
Understanding that auditors allocate greater resources to fraud brainstorming when engagement risk is significant fosters brainstorming of a superior caliber corresponds to stronger regulatory compliance. Auditors report that engagement teams are holding fraud brainstorming sessions earlier in the audit, document more detailed risk assessments, plan more specific procedures, and retain more documentation. These characteristics contribute to adequately addressing increased PCAOB regulatory scrutiny. Additionally, brainstorming sessions are highly regarded when they occur in a face-to-face fashion and are attended by multiple levels of firm personnel—whether that is “core” or “non-core” professionals. Fraud brainstorming sessions are executed less mechanically (as determined by PCAOB inspectors) by using fewer checklists and increase the amount of time auditors prepare for brainstorming sessions.
Dennis, S. A., and K. M. Johnstone. 2016. A Field Survey of Contemporary Brainstorming Practices. Accounting Horizons 30 (4): 449–472.
These findings demonstrate that, although the profession is calling for more skepticism, the underlying culture may inhibit such behavior if auditors are punished for being skeptical when it turns out there is no misstatement. In relation to consultation prior to skeptical behavior, an internal firm-level training that makes evaluators more aware of outcome bias may be more effective than a subordinate-driven solution if encouraging skeptical behavior.
Brazel, J. F., S. B. Jackson, T. J. Schaefer, and B. W. Stewart. 2016. The Outcome Effect and Professional Skepticism. The Accounting Review 91 (6): 1577 – 1599.
These results have important implications for audit practice, as the author shows that the specific techniques used by auditors to gather evidence for building knowledge structures are essential to resisting client influence. This paper also shows that in spite of the responsibility of understanding complex business environments and any resulting indicators, evidence finds that even experienced decision makers have difficulty learning in dynamically complex environments. Improving judgment and decision making in these settings requires enhancing auditors’ development of systems-based mental models.
Brewster, B. 2016. The Effect of Client Lies on Auditor Memory Resistance and False memory Acceptance. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (3): 33-50.
The authors believe that when armed with knowledge of how management may intentionally or unintentionally introduce error into their FVMs, auditors will be better able to take steps to adjust for this error. Currently, professional skepticism is the best way to combat this problem. Researchers and policy makers within firms need to grapple with the possibility that existing audit team structure and incentives may not be compatible with audits that require more and more specialized valuation knowledge.
Martin, R. D., J. S. Rich, and T. J. Wilks. 2006. Auditing Fair Value Measurements: A Synthesis of Relevant Research. Accounting Horizons 20 (3): 287-303.
The findings of this study have important implications for practice. Although prior research has suggested that an audit judgment rule may improve audit quality, findings from this research suggest that audit quality may decrease. This is seen indirectly by the audit committee members’ belief that accounting estimates become less conservative and due diligence decreases when there is an audit judgment rule. However, this was not directly tested, and future research is needed to determine whether audit judgment rules are beneficial or not.
Kang, Y.J., A.J. Trotman, and K.T. Trotman. 2015. The effect of an Audit Judgment Rule on audit committee members’ professional skepticism: The case of accounting estimates. Accounting, Organizations and Society 46: 59-76.
The findings of this study have important implications for practice. Given the concern from the PCAOB regarding auditors’ lack of professional skepticism, this paper finds a mechanism to increase and improve the level of professional skepticism. In addition, the technique the author finds (providing high-level construal instructions) to auditors is “simple to use, inexpensive, and can easily be tailored for a firm’s specific needs or language”.
Rasso, J.T. 2015. Construal instructions and professional skepticism in evaluating complex estimates. Accounting, Organizations and Society 46: 44-55.
The results of this study suggest a course of action for enhancing professional skepticism, so they are important for audit firms specializing in privately held clients, which is an institutional setting where auditors may find it more difficult to maintain their objectivity. The authors suggest that audit firms can use their internal messaging to help individual auditors decrease the harmful effects of client identification. Specifically, audit firms can encourage auditors to (1) take the perspective of financial statement users (e.g., shareholders), (2) view themselves and clients as members of a group assigned the goal of providing accurate financial statements to shareholders, and/or (3) identify more strongly with the audit firm or the audit profession. Furthermore, the authors suggest that audit firms increase client commitment by encouraging auditors to be more attentive and available to clients (e.g., catching up with clients periodically and spending more time at the client site) and encouraging clients to feel free to reach out to auditors.
Herda, D. N. and J. J. Lavelle. 2015. Client Identification and Client Commitment in a Privately Held Client Setting: Unique Constructs with Opposite Effects on Auditor Objectivity. Accounting Horizons 29 (3): 577-601.
Based on the interviews and problems identified, the authors conjecture that potentially suboptimal auditing methods are being used to evaluate complex estimates which are an important and growing part of the financial statements. This may be negatively impacting audit quality. More specifically, auditors over-rely on management estimates because they lack the knowledge and incentives to behave otherwise. This possibility has direct consequences for auditor professional skepticism because increasing professional skepticism may be less effective unless auditors are also given the requisite knowledge to properly use it. These problems are reinforced by auditing standards and regulators which generally outline/criticize the current auditing methods without suggesting new or better ones.
Griffith, E., J. Hammersley, and K. Kadous. 2015. Audits of Complex Estimates as Verification of Management Numbers: How Institutional Pressures Shape Practice. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (3): 833-863.