This study makes important contributions regarding management’s disclosure of material weakness deficiencies. Currently, only audit-related risks are required to be addressed in material weakness deficiency disclosures. However, this study indicates that nonprofessional investors also take non-audit-related risks into consideration when making a financial reporting risk assessment. Managers do have the discretion to provide information about non-related audit risks through nonaudited disclosures. The authors suggest that in doing so managers can mitigate investors’ negative reaction the material weakness from lack of communication.
Asare, S. K., and A. M. Wright. 2017. Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material Weakness Disclosures. Behavioral Research In Accounting.
http://commons.aaahq.org/groups/e5075f0eec/summary
Understanding that auditors allocate greater resources to fraud brainstorming when engagement risk is significant fosters brainstorming of a superior caliber corresponds to stronger regulatory compliance. Auditors report that engagement teams are holding fraud brainstorming sessions earlier in the audit, document more detailed risk assessments, plan more specific procedures, and retain more documentation. These characteristics contribute to adequately addressing increased PCAOB regulatory scrutiny. Additionally, brainstorming sessions are highly regarded when they occur in a face-to-face fashion and are attended by multiple levels of firm personnel—whether that is “core” or “non-core” professionals. Fraud brainstorming sessions are executed less mechanically (as determined by PCAOB inspectors) by using fewer checklists and increase the amount of time auditors prepare for brainstorming sessions.
Dennis, S. A., and K. M. Johnstone. 2016. A Field Survey of Contemporary Brainstorming Practices. Accounting Horizons 30 (4): 449–472.
These results imply that auditors are more likely to render modified GC opinions for clients subject to regimes that hold auditors liable to a larger class of third parties and impose joint-and-several liability for third-party damages, both of which reflect greater liability exposure. The higher incidence of GC opinions accompanying stronger state-level litigation threats could reflect higher audit quality, but it could also stem from excessively conservative auditors protecting their interests by avoiding costly civil lawsuits, which could undermine audit quality in some circumstances.
Anantharaman, D., J. A. Pittman, and N. Wans. 2016. State Liability Regimes within the United States and Auditor Reporting. The Accounting Review 91 (6): 1545 – 1575.
These results imply that risk assessment approach can have a significant effect on the assessed risk of material misstatement and, thus, on audit program decisions that influence audit effectiveness and efficiency. The existence of assertion framing effects may directly affect the level of professional skepticism and audit effectiveness and efficiency. Both studies indicate that when belief-based assessments are transformed into probabilities, the difference from the direct probability assessments of risk is not significant; thus, obtaining belief-based assessments might make obtaining probability assessments redundant and also has the advantage of providing explicit assessments of ambiguity.
Mock, T. J. and H. Fukukawa. 2016. Auditors’ Risk Assessments: The Effects of Elicitation Approach and Assertion Framing. Behavioral Research in Accounting 28 (2): 75 – 84.
This study contributes by providing evidence regarding a type of reasoning process that appears to help auditors assess the risk that a misstatement identified during audit fieldwork was caused intentionally. In addition to considering fraud risks at the company level, auditors should also consider fraud risks that are specific to an operating location or individual manager. By considering a client manager’s perspective, auditors presumably gain insight into whether the manager perceived misstating to be personally beneficial and reasonably easy to perpetrate and conceal, assisting in the evaluation of the manager’s intentions.
Hamilton, E. L. 2016. Evaluating the Intentionality of Identified Misstatements: How Perspective Can Help Auditors in Distinguishing Errors from Fraud. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (4): 57 – 78.
Given that REM often causes significant auditor discomfort, the authors’ paper provides broader REM and auditor comfort-related questions pertaining to the effects of management’s focus on short-term results, the extent to which REM is a problem that can or needs to be fixed, and the possibility that REM is a gateway to more serious forms of accounting manipulation.
Commerford, B. P., D. R. Hermanson, R. W. Houston, and M. F. Peters. 2016. Real Earnings Management: A Threat to Auditor Comfort? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (4): 39 – 56.
This paper incorporates important organizational theory into the fraud literature by reporting the presence of an instrumental climate when fraud is being perpetrated within an organization. Internal auditors and those charged with governance could adapt this climate measure as a red flag for potential fraud.
Murphy, P. R. and C. Free. 2016. Broadening the Fraud Triangle: Instrumental Climate and Fraud. Behavioral Research in Accounting 28 (1): 41-56.
The importance of understanding the operation of a client’s business and its competitive environment to achieve an effective audit is well-known. More specifically, the PCAOB requires that an auditor understand the company’s objectives and strategies and those related business risks that might reasonably be expected to result in risks of material misstatement. Valid understanding also is necessary to both interpret results from analytical procedures and to engage in effective professional skepticism for management’s assertions. The author’s results reveal a previously unreported level of understanding of process-oriented business risks and their association with the RMM of revenue for essentially new staff auditors.
Wright, W. F. 2016. Client business, models, process business risks and the risk of material misstatement of revenue. Accounting, Organizations and Society 48: 43-55.
Implications for the practicing audit community are developed from the findings that less experienced auditors are susceptible to the information choice effect. In situations where litigation risk is low (high) and the auditor has less experience, auditors place greater (lower) significance on information given to them by an external party than information they sought out themselves. More experienced auditors are not subject to the information choice effect. Additionally, more experienced auditors are confident in judgments based on information sought themselves, even in a setting with elevated litigation risk. The results of this study may interest audit clients providing information to auditors, auditors reviewing the work of less (more) experienced colleagues, auditors performing a critical self-review, and regulators reviewing the work of auditors.
Smith, S. D., W. B. Tayler, and D. F. Prawitt. 2016. The Effect of Information Choice on Auditors' Judgments and Confidence. Accounting Horizons 30 (3): 393–408.
This paper sheds light on the implications of a going concern opinion, specifically in the context of litigation against the auditor. While prior research has established that a going concern opinion reduces the likelihood of shareholder litigation in bankruptcy proceedings, this study shows that going concern opinions potentially open up the auditor to increased SEC litigation if the financial statements are found to be fraudulent. The authors suggest this should be taken into consideration when auditors are determining the extent of necessary documentation for fraud risk assessment, especially when the client is likely receiving a going concern opinion.
Eutsler, J., E.B. Nickell, S.W. Robb. 2016. Fraud Risk Awareness and the Likelihood of Audit Enforcement Action. Accounting Horizons 30 (3): 379-392.