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  • The Auditing Section
    An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former...1
    research summary posted May 7, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 03.0 Auditor Selection and Auditor Changes, 03.01 Auditor Qualifications, 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 04.07 Audit Firm Rotation in Auditing Section Research Summary Database > Auditing Section Research Summaries Space public
    Title:
    An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study suggest that the auditor changes resulting from the demise of Andersen did not result in improved financial reporting quality and transparency for the former Andersen clients that parted ways with their former audit practice.  This implies that the mandatory rotation of auditors may not yield an increase in financial statement quality.  This result should be of interest to audit regulators and standard setters, as well as practitioners seeking to comment on proposed mandatory rotation regulations. 

    Additionally, the results indicate that switching costs in non-forced auditor change settings likely outweigh agency benefits of changing auditors in many cases.  This result may be of interest to shareholders, managers, and audit committees in their respective roles related to auditor selection.

    Citation:

    Blouin, J., B. M. Grein, and B. R. Rountree. 2007. An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients. The Accounting Review 82 (3): 621-650.

    Keywords:
    auditor selection, auditor change, mandatory auditor rotation, audit quality, earnings quality, Arthur Andersen
    Purpose of the Study:
    • To investigate the factors that contributed to firms' decisions to either retain their Andersen audit team who migrated to another audit firm, or engage a new auditor, after the collapse of Andersen.
    • To investigate the effect of forced auditor change on client firms' financial statement quality.
    • To examine the costs (switching costs and agency costs) a company faces in switching to a new auditor.
    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors use a sample of 407 Andersen clients.  The authors classify companies as retaining their Andersen audit team if the audit report in the year after Andersen's collapse indicates the new auditor within a city acquired the Andersen audit practice in that same city. Companies that did not adhere to this were classified as having switched to a different auditor.  In performing this analysis, the authors examine “Switching costs” (i.e. Andersen industry expertise, auditor tenure, auditee size, auditee complexity, and discretionary accruals) and “Agency Costs” (i.e. auditee size, auditee complexity and transparency, insider ownership, leverage, presence of a blockholder, and audit committee expertise and independence.

    Findings:
    • Companies faced with greater switching costs were more likely to stay with their Andersen audit team.  (Note: Greater switching costs include aggressive accruals, a financial expert on the audit committee, and Andersen industry specialization)
    • Companies with greater agency concerns (higher monitoring costs faced by outside shareholders) were more likely to sever ties with their Andersen audit team and hire a new auditor.
    • Companies in the highest quintile of performance-matched discretionary accruals that followed Andersen curbed their accrual behavior in the year after Andersen’s collapse, while there was no change for those that did not follow Andersen.
    • Overall company governance characteristics were not associated with the decision to retain or switch.
    • Overall, the evidence suggests that switching costs likely often outweigh benefits of changing auditors, which explains why we observe infrequent auditor changes for most companies.
    • Evidence in the study suggests mandatory rotation may not be effective in improving client firms' overall financial statement quality.
    Category:
    Auditor Selection and Auditor Changes, Independence & Ethics
    Sub-category:
    Auditor Qualifications (e.g. size - industry expertise), Audit Firm Rotation, Audit Firm Rotation
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  • The Auditing Section
    Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality
    research summary posted May 7, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 04.07 Audit Firm Rotation, 05.0 Audit Team Composition, 05.03 Partner Rotation, 15.0 International Matters, 15.03 Audit Partner Rotation in Auditing Section Research Summary Database > Auditing Section Research Summaries Space public
    Title:
    Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study are limited to the debate concerning individual audit partner rotation and do not support the argument for, or negate the prior studies that examine, audit firm rotation.  Combining the results of this study with the prior studies suggests that audit firms develop, over time, client and industry-specific knowledge that increases their ability to provide quality audits, and if quality control procedures within the firm are adequate (such as might be expected at a Big 6 firm), then rotating audit partners periodically helps maintain the auditor’s independence and objectivity while minimizing the loss of client-specific knowledge and rtise.

    Citation:

    Carey, P. and R. Simnett 2006. Audit Partner Tenure and Audit Quality. The Accounting Review 81 (3): 653-676.

    Keywords:
    audit partner tenure; audit quality; qualifications; earnings management
    Purpose of the Study:

    For many years, regulators have expressed concern regarding auditors’ extended associations with particular audit clients (i.e., long auditor tenure) and its potential impact on auditors’ independence and objectivity.  In the U.S., the AICPA Practice Section mandated in the 1970’s that audit partners rotate off their client after a seven year period.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 decreased this period to five years for public company engagements.  Outside the U.S., countries following international accounting standards and the Code of Ethics implemented by the International Federation of Accountants, as well as the United Kingdom and Australia, adopted similar standards by the early 2000’s due to the perceived “familiarity threat” associated with long auditor tenure.  Two of the arguments for mandatory rotation are that long auditor tenure 1) results in personal relationships with the client that could impair, consciously or subconsciously, the auditor’s independence, and 2) weakens the auditor’s ability to critically evaluate the client’s assertions.  However, to date, there is little empirical evidence to support these
    arguments.

    Due to data limitations, previous studies examining auditor tenure tend to focus on tenure of the audit firm as a whole.  Contrary to regulators’ perceptions, those studies tend to find that audit quality actually deteriorates in the early years after a change in the client’s audit firm, which is attributed to the “learning curve” effect, and that higher audit quality is associated with longer audit firm tenure, which is consistent with the audit firm developing more knowledge and familiarity with the client and industry as time progresses.  Based on their actions, regulators appear convinced that the potential benefits associated with auditor rotation are greater than the potential risks.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is to further examine whether long auditor tenure contributes to decreased audit quality in a setting where individual audit partners can be identified for particular audit clients.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors rely on data for Australian-domiciled companies publicly traded on the Australian Stock Exchange in 1995.  The authors accumulate auditor tenure information through 1997.

    The authors proxy for audit quality using three different measures: 1) the auditor’s propensity to issue a going-concern opinion; 2) the client’s reporting of abnormal working capital accruals; and 3) the extent to which key earnings targets are just beaten or missed.  Using the results of prior studies and the arguments and policies provided by regulators, the authors examine the association between audit quality and three measures of auditor tenure: less than two years, three to seven years, and greater than seven years.

    Findings:
    • For going-concern opinions, the authors find that longer audit partner tenures do decrease the individual auditors’ propensity to issue such an opinion.  Sensitivity analyses for this test suggest that these results are driven by non-Big 6 audit firm partners.
    • The results of this study find no association between abnormal working capital accruals and longer audit partner tenure. 
      These findings are in contrast to a prior study that examines the Taiwanese market and does find some support for an increased association between abnormal accruals (i.e., lower earnings quality) and longer auditor tenures,
    • The results show limited evidence of fewer clients just missing earnings benchmarks (i.e., more clients beating earnings benchmarks) in cases where the audit partner has longer tenure at the client.
    Category:
    Independence & Ethics, Audit Team Composition, International Matters
    Sub-category:
    Audit Firm Rotation, Partner Rotation, Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Firm Rotation
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  • The Auditing Section
    Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Quality, and Market...6
    research summary posted May 7, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 04.07 Audit Firm Rotation, 15.0 International Matters, 15.03 Audit Partner Rotation in Auditing Section Research Summary Database > Auditing Section Research Summaries Space public
    Title:
    Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Quality, and Market Perception: Evidence from Taiwan and Discussion of “Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Quality, and Market Perception: Evidence from Taiwan”
    Practical Implications:

    The adoption of mandatory partner rotation in many countries suggests that regulators believe that the benefits of rotation outweigh the costs and thus a policy of mandatory rotation enhances audit quality. The results of this study provide initial evidence of the effects of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality. Contrary to regulators’ beliefs, the findings do not support the assumption that audit partner rotation will lead to audit quality increases. One caveat to these findings is whether the findings will generalize to other countries with different regulatory and legal regimes.

    Citation:

    Chi, W., H. Huang, Y. Liao, and H. Xie. 2009. Mandatory audit partner rotation, audit quality, and market perception: Evidence from Taiwan. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 359-391. 

    Bamber, E.M., and L.S. Bamber. 2009. Discussion of “Mandatory audit partner rotation, audit quality, and market perception: Evidence from Taiwan”. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 393-402.

    Keywords:
    audit quality; audit partner rotation
    Purpose of the Study:

    The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) reduced the period that an audit partner is allowed to serve a particular client from seven consecutive years (required by the AICPA since the 1970s) to five years. The assumption behind the mandatory rotation requirement is that rotating the audit partner will improve auditor independence and audit quality. Research on audit firm rotation in the U.S. suggests that longer audit firm tenure with a client increases audit quality.  Although, as Bamber and Bamber point out, the results of audit firm rotation may be different than audit partner rotation because the costs and benefits are quite different.  For example, in rotating audit firms, the new firm brings an entirely new audit team and a new audit methodology. In rotating an audit partner, many factors continue to be the same under the new partner (the team, the overall audit methodology, the firm’s history with the client, etc.). Due to the lack of audit partner data in the U.S., this study utilizes audit partner data from Taiwan to assess the effect of mandatory audit partner rotation on audit quality. More specifically, the authors address two primary issues:

    • The authors examine whether a sample of firms subject to mandatory rotation have higher audit quality as compared to three benchmarks: 1) a sample of firms not subject to mandatory rotation, 2) the mandatory sample in the year prior to adoption, and 3) a sample of firms with voluntary audit partner rotation.
    • The authors examine whether investors perceive higher audit quality for the firms subject to the mandatory rotation requirements relative to the three benchmark samples mentioned above.
    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors use data for publicly-listed firms in Taiwan from the 2004 Taiwan Economic Journal database.  Mandatory audit partner rotation became mandatory for firms listed on the two major stock exchanges in 2004.  For the 2004 firms, some companies had partners that were required to rotate off the engagement (firms subject to mandatory rotation in that year) whereas other companies did not have partners required to rotate as they had not been on the engagement long enough yet (a non-rotation sample). 

    Findings:
    • Audit quality is not significantly different when comparing the sample of Taiwan firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 to the sample of Taiwan firms not subject to mandatory rotation in 2004.  They also find no significant difference in audit quality when comparing the sample of Taiwan firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 to the sample of Taiwan firms whose audit partner voluntarily rotated in years before 2003.  
    • The audit quality provided by new partners for Taiwan firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 is lower than the audit quality of those same Taiwan firms one year earlier, when the audit was led by the prior partner.
    • The authors find that perceived audit quality is not significantly different when comparing the sample of Taiwan firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 to the sample of Taiwan firms not subject to mandatory rotation in 2004.  They also find no difference in perceived audit quality when comparing the sample of Taiwan firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 to the sample of those same Taiwan firms one year earlier.  They find that perceived audit quality is significantly higher for firms subject to mandatory rotation in 2004 compared to firms where audit partners voluntarily rotated prior to 2003. 
    Category:
    Independence & Ethics, International Matters
    Sub-category:
    Audit Firm Rotation, Audit Partner Rotation, Audit Firm Rotation
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