The adoption of mandatory partner rotation in many countries suggests that regulators believe that the benefits of rotation outweigh the costs and thus a policy of mandatory rotation enhances audit quality. The results of this study provide initial evidence of the effects of mandatory partner rotation on audit quality. Contrary to regulators’ beliefs, the findings do not support the assumption that audit partner rotation will lead to audit quality increases. One caveat to these findings is whether the findings will generalize to other countries with different regulatory and legal regimes.
Chi, W., H. Huang, Y. Liao, and H. Xie. 2009. Mandatory audit partner rotation, audit quality, and market perception: Evidence from Taiwan. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 359-391.
Bamber, E.M., and L.S. Bamber. 2009. Discussion of “Mandatory audit partner rotation, audit quality, and market perception: Evidence from Taiwan”. Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 393-402.
The results of this study suggest that the auditor changes resulting from the demise of Andersen did not result in improved financial reporting quality and transparency for the former Andersen clients that parted ways with their former audit practice. This implies that the mandatory rotation of auditors may not yield an increase in financial statement quality. This result should be of interest to audit regulators and standard setters, as well as practitioners seeking to comment on proposed mandatory rotation regulations.
Additionally, the results indicate that switching costs in non-forced auditor change settings likely outweigh agency benefits of changing auditors in many cases. This result may be of interest to shareholders, managers, and audit committees in their respective roles related to auditor selection.
Blouin, J., B. M. Grein, and B. R. Rountree. 2007. An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients. The Accounting Review 82 (3): 621-650.
The implementation of a mandatory audit firm rotation in the United States would have large implications within the accounting industry. This study provides the PCAOB and other regulators with relevant information regarding the potential policy. The evidence indicates that the majority of investors would have a negative reaction to a mandatory audit firm rotation. It is possible the investors believe the potential benefits of rotation are outweighed by the costs, direct and indirect.
Reid, Lauren C., and J. V. Carcello. 2017. “Investor Reaction to the Prospect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation”. The Accounting Review. 92.1 (2017): 183.
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These results should be of specific interest to regulators who have proposed rules to increase the accountability of auditors by more clearly aligning their reputations with assurance quality, as well as to regulators who have expressed concerns that pressures associated with future audit fee dependence could influence the extent to which auditors behave independently. This study is not meant to be used to influence discussion surrounding mandatory audit firm rotation, as the study focused on voluntary, not mandatory, terminations of the audit-client relationship.
Cassell, C., L. Myers, T. Seidel, and J. Zhou. 2016. The Effect of Lame Duck Auditors on Management Discretion: An Empirical Analysis. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (3): 51-73.
Organizational learning and knowledge depreciation play a significant role in a firm’s audit strategy, pricing strategy, budgeting and forecasting. Failing to account for knowledge dissipation and differences in learning across personnel may lead to costly errors in the budgeting process. Furthermore, finding that there is little or no learning among lower-level staff provides empirical support for the concern of the effects of high turnover rates among lower-level staff in public accounting. This suggests that targeting retention at this level might reduce costs, including the costs of continuously having to train new personnel.
Causholli, M. 2016. Evidence of Organizational Learning and Organizational Forgetting from Financial Statement Audits. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (2): 53-72.
The results of this study are important to understanding the potential benefits of joint engagement partner audits compared to single-partner audits. The results of this study identify an association between the type of partner audit (joint vs. single) and audit quality and audit fees. As regulators consider the association between joint audits and audit quality, the results of this study suggest there are benefits to joint-partner audits, particularly when the partners are located in the same office. Compared to single-partner audits, joint-partner audits are associated with higher audit quality. Compared to joint audit firms, joint-partner audits appear to provide the same benefits without the increased cost.
Ittonen, K., and P. C. Trønnes. 2015. Benefits and costs of appointing joint audit engagement partners. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 34 (3): 23-46.
In first-year audits, lower audit process quality and higher total audit hours are possible additional costs that should be considered in the ongoing debate on mandatory audit firm rotation. Moreover, study results are consistent with the notion that—even prior to the effective date of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)—market and related regulatory forces disciplined auditors of public entities to achieve a high level of audit quality when tenure was long or fees from auditor-provided non-audit services were large. In order to serve the public interest, these considerations should be included in assessments of the economic costs and benefits of restrictions on audit firm tenure and non-audit services.
Furthermore, the results suggest that, in the private-client market, audit process quality declines in the long tenure range and when non-audit fees become large, which may be of interest to standard setters in the private sector (e.g., the Auditing Standards Board and US State Boards of Accountancy).
Bell, T.B., M. Causholli, and W.R. Knechel. 2015. Audit Firm Tenure, Non-Audit Services, and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 53(3):461-509.
The results of this study are important for both audit firms and regulators when considering the potential impact of mandatory audit firm rotation. Standard setters appear to increasingly advocate for auditors to utilize a mental frame in which they evaluate management assertions in terms of their level of dishonesty relative to verification their honesty. If this preference is ultimately paired with mandatory audit firm rotation, it could actually have a deleterious effect on audit quality. Conversely, this study finds that audit firm rotation can increase audit quality when auditors frame their mental representations of management’s assertions in terms of verification of their honest representations.
Bowlin, K. O., J. L. Hobson, and M. D. Piercey. 2015. The Effects of Auditor Rotation, Professional Skepticism, and Interactions with Managers on Audit Quality. The Accounting Review 90 (4): 1363-1393.
This study sheds light on what underlies decision making in the imperative audit committee responsibility of auditor appointment: nuanced interactions and power asymmetry among management, the audit committee, and auditors. The auditors viewed the CFO as the client and tailored the proposal accordingly. The audit committee will not be effective unless both auditors and audit committee members fundamentally change their mindsets about their respective roles in relation to client management. As large public companies employ multiple Big 4 firm, the viability of severing existing relationships to bring in a truly independent auditor mindset through audit firm rotation is questionable.
Fiolleau, K., Hoang, K., Jamal, K., & Sunder, S. 2013. How Do Regulatory Reforms to Enhance Auditor Independence Work in Practice? Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (3): 864-890.
The lower quality and higher effort associated with first-year audits represent additional costs that should be considered in the ongoing debate on mandatory audit firm rotation. The differential findings for private and public clients suggest that market and related regulatory forces discipline auditors of SEC clients to maintain a high level of audit quality even when tenure is long or NAS fees are high. The findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor-provided NAS. The finding that quality declines in private-client audits as NAS fees increase or tenure becomes long should be of interest to standard setters in the private sector.
Bell, T. B., Causholli, M., & Knechel, W. R. 2015. Audit Firm Tenure, Non-Audit Services, and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality. Journal Of Accounting Research 53 (3): 461-509.