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    Audit team time reporting: An agency theory perspective
    research summary posted October 21, 2015 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, last edited March 21, 2017, tagged 09.0 Auditor Judgment, 09.11 Auditor judgment in the workpaper review process, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.06 Working Paper Review – Conduct, Biases and Predispositions 
    Audit team time reporting: An agency theory perspective
    Practical Implications:

    The findings show that managers implicitly encourage auditors to underreport time when dealing with a favorable client. While CPA firms have decreased explicit incentives to underreport, these implicit incentives makes it likely that seniors are underreporting their time. This can lead to unrealistic budgets and possible costing issues for firms. Also, if a senior does not underreport they could risk getting a bad evaluation or not be assigned to desirable future engagements. These situations could lead to a reduction in raises, promotions, and continued employment.


    Agoglia, C. P., R. C. Hatfield, and T. A. Lambert. 2015. Audit team time reporting: An agency theory perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society 44: 1-14.

    auditor judgement, audit quality, workpaper review, underreporting
    Purpose of the Study:

    There is a substantial concern that audit teams underreport time for audit engagements. While some recent research suggests that explicit incentives to underreport have been reduced, other research suggests that there still may be implicit incentives to underreport. Based on agency theory, it is likely that reviewers rate the preparer more favorably when the client is desirable and the preparer underreported their time. The purpose of this study is to investigate this concern by evaluating how reviewer’s performance evaluations of the preparer and future staffing decisions are influenced by the following factors:

    • Desirability of the client
    • Whether the preparer underreported or reported accurately.
    Design/Method/ Approach:

    Data for this paper was collected prior to May 2015 by mailing experimental instruments to both managers and partners of CPA firms.  


    Managers rated the performance of a senior higher when they underreported time and were working on a desirable client. The findings also show that managers are more likely to request an underreporting senior on a future audit engagement. However, partners did not show any preference to seniors who underreported time.

    Audit Quality & Quality Control, Auditor Judgment
    Auditor judgment in the workpaper review process, Working Paper Review – Conduct - Biases & Predispositions