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    Auditor Ratification: Can’t Get No &...
    research summary posted April 19, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 03.0 Auditor Selection and Auditor Changes, 03.01 Auditor Qualifications 
    Auditor Ratification: Can’t Get No (Dis)Satisfaction
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study are important for audit firms to consider given interest from regulators on the role of shareholder ratification on auditor selection.  The evidence indicates that proxy advisor recommendations significantly influence the number of dissenting auditor ratification votes.  Unfavorable recommendations are more likely when there are concerns regarding auditor independence rather than audit quality.


    Lauren M. Cunningham (2017) Auditor Ratification: Can't Get No (Dis)Satisfaction. Accounting Horizons: March 2017, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 159-175.

    auditor ratification; corporate governance; proxy advisor; proxy disclosure; shareholder voting.
    Purpose of the Study:

    This study looks at the role of proxy advisor recommendations in shareholder voting on auditor ratification.  Given the importance of shareholder involvement and the influence of proxy advisors to influence other voting outcomes, the author investigates the characteristics of the company and audit firm that lead to an unfavorable recommendation on auditor ratification.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The author uses company-year observations for the Russell 3000 firms with shareholder voting on auditor ratification occurring during shareholder meetings from January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2012.  More than ninety percent of firms in their sample voluntarily include auditor ratification on the ballot.


    The author finds that:

    • On average, the percentage of dissenting votes on an Auditor ratification is 8.6 percent when proxy advisors issue an Against recommendation.
    • The dissenting votes are higher when there are concerns over auditor independence (non-audit service fees are higher, auditor tenure is longer) or when the proxy advisor’s recommendation is more influential (percentage of blockholders is lower and institutional ownership is higher).
    • Proxy advisors are less likely to issue an unfavorable recommendation when firms have stronger performance or a willingness to disclose internal control issues and are more likely to issue an unfavorable recommendation when the auditor tenure is longer or when the audit firm is a Big 4 Audit firm.
    • Proxy advisors issue more unfavorable recommendations when there are suspected concerns about auditor independence (69 to 85 percent) then when there are concerns regarding audit quality (4 to 12 percent).
    Auditor Selection and Auditor Changes
    Auditor Qualifications (e.g. size - industry expertise)