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    If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit...
    research summary posted February 16, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 05.0 Audit Team Composition, 05.01 Use of Specialists e.g., financial instruments, actuaries, valuation, 09.0 Auditor Judgment, 09.09 Impact of Consultation on Judgments 
    If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates
    Practical Implications:

    The finding that higher decision authority can have negative audit quality implications is relevant to audit firm policies, which often vest substantial authority in consultants, and to the ongoing debate over standards for the use of specialists. This and other findings also suggest that it may be beneficial to advocate lower decision authority. Finally, the findings can inform audit firm policies that require consultation with knowledgeable persons, as well as standard-setters and regulators whose responsibilities to provide guidance on using consultation to conduct more effective audits of financial statement estimates. 


    Knechel, W. R. and J. Leiby. 2016. If You Want My Advice: Status Motives and Audit Consultations About Accounting Estimates. Journal of Accounting Research 54 (5): 1331 – 1364. 

    Purpose of the Study:

    Financial reports contain many complex accounting estimates that require significant auditor judgment and can increase the risk of material misstatements. Auditors often struggle to maintain the requisite knowledge and questioning mindset necessary to effectively assess these estimates. Little is known about how the efficacy of consultation and the conditions under which consultants provide advice that might improve the audit of estimates. Consultation in auditing is pervasive and has substantial potential benefits, thus the availability of useful advice is often a necessary condition to improve the audit of estimates. In this study, the authors examine two properties of advice that are likely to help improve auditor judgment on accounting estimates: contrariness and precision. Contrariness refers to the degree to which a consultant’s advice differs from the advice-seeker’s own opinion, and precision refers to the narrowness of the range of options presented by a consultant to an advice seeker, that is, reducing the range of possible outcomes to be considered. 

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors conduct an experiment with a number of audit managers and senior managers from a U.S. accounting firm. The authors manipulate status motives by priming auditors with a brief story prior to the task in which they act as a consultant to another auditor regarding the discount rate a client uses to estimate the fair value of a securitized asset. 

    • The authors find that a consultant’s recommendations are influenced by specialized knowledge and decision authority conditional on their status motives.
      • More specifically, when status motives are active, consultants with higher specialized knowledge are more precise but less contrary than those with lower knowledge.
    • The authors find that consultants recommend changes to the end of the range that is further from management’s preference, thus this increased precision is unlikely to influence the evaluation and ultimate quality of the estimate.
    • The authors find that precision decreases with higher decision authority and increases only when decision authority is lower and status motives are active. 
    Audit Team Composition, Auditor Judgment
    Impact of Consultation on Judgments, Use of Specialists (e.g. financial instruments – actuaries - valuation)