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    When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder...
    research summary posted September 14, 2015 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.10 Impact of Quality Reviewers, 11.11 Impact of Firm and External Inspection Programs, 12.0 Accountants’ Reports and Reporting, 12.04 Investigations 
    When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction to GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports of Small Auditors.
    Practical Implications:

    The authors provide initial empirical evidence that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registrants found GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports to be a useful signal of audit quality for triennially inspected auditors. This evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity in auditor brand name that did not previously exist. Also, this paper is the first to empirically link audit committee characteristics to PCAOB inspection report severity and auditor choice. The authors believe this is an increasingly relevant finding as audit committees have been granted much greater auditor dismissal and hiring authority due to SOX. This study indicates that a PCAOB inspection report may serve as an audit quality signal for auditors of broker-dealers, who were previously exempt from the inspection process. Such a finding has current relevance given the PCAOB has recently sought to expand the inspection program to foreign auditors, such as those based in China whose clients are cross-listed on U.S. security exchanges or are listed due to a reverse merger.


    Abbott, L. J., K. A. Gunny, and T. C. Zhang. 2013. When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction to GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports of Small Auditors. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 32 (2): 1-31.

    audit quality signals, PCAOB inspection process
    Purpose of the Study:

    The PCAOB is a private regulatory agency, independent of the accounting industry. Congress bestowed upon the PCAOB the ability to inspect the work of all accounting firms that audit publicly traded companies. Inspections are conducted annually for Big 4 and national auditors with greater than 100 publicly held registrants (annually inspected auditors). The inspection process is conducted every three years for auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients (triennially inspected auditors). The authors classify inspection reports into three categories according to severity. In a clean report, the PCAOB finds no audit deficiencies. In a GAAS-deficient report, the PCAOB notes that the financial statements audited by the auditor are free of material error, but that the audit process did not fully follow GAAS-recommended audit procedures. In a GAAP-deficient report, the PCAOB states that the auditor “failed to identify a material departure from GAAP” or that the audited company “restated certain of its financial statements to make changes relating to” matters/audit deficiencies uncovered by the PCAOB inspection.

    The current study examines the PCAOB in the context of whether GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports of triennially inspected auditors are enough of a deleterious audit-quality signal to prompt dismissals of these auditors. This study then identifies the successor triennially inspected auditor and uses the three-tiered categorization scheme to denote an increase in auditor quality. Specifically, the authors create a dichotomous dismissal-based dependent variable coded “1” in cases where the dismissal results in a higher-quality triennially inspected successor auditor, and “0” otherwise.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors obtain all inspection reports from the PCAOB website from January 21, 2005 to December 31, 2007. A total of 521 triennially inspected nonforeign accounting firm PCAOB inspection reports were filed, of which 256 (49.1 percent) were clean, and 61 (11.7 percent) were GAAP-deficient. The 54 GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are included in the sample. The 54 GAAP-deficient auditors report 525 publicly held clients per their PCAOB inspection reports.

    • The authors find that GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely to be dismissed by their clients and are overwhelmingly replaced by a triennially inspected successor that has not received a GAAP-deficient inspection report.
    • They also document that the dismissal rate for the clean PCAOB inspection report sample is 17.9 percent, while the dismissal rate for the GAAP-deficient sample is a significantly higher 44.3 percent.
    • The authors find that greater agency conflicts, the presence of an independent and expert audit committee, and blockholdings magnify the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor in favor of a triennially inspected auditor that is not GAAP-deficient.
    • Interestingly, the authors find that opinion shopping or fee shopping does not differentially impact the likelihood of dismissing a GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditor in favor of a triennially inspected auditor that is not GAAP-deficient.
    • The authors link the use of PCAOB inspection reports to an agency-based demand for audit quality signals.
    Accountants' Reporting, Audit Quality & Quality Control, Standard Setting
    Impact of Firm & External Inspection Programs, Impact of PCAOB, Impact of Quality Reviewers, Investigations