The results of this study are important to audit regulators and auditors as the PCAOB considers disclosure of additional audit quality indicators. The results of this study indicate that clients do respond to publicly available indications of audit quality as they avoid audit firm offices that are associated with restatements. Additionally, auditors may be interested in the findings of this study as it relates to the economic implications of contaminated offices. The findings of this study provide evidence about the importance of local office reputation as client retention and new client additions decrease when offices are associated with audit failures.

Swanquist, Q.T. and R.L. Whited. 2015. Do Clients Avoid “Contaminated” Offices? The Economic Consequences of Low-Quality Audits. The Accounting Review 90(6): 2537-2570.

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This research is important for several reasons. First, the authors provide insight into how a monitoring mechanism, such as the staff of the DCF, adds to the oversight of the financial reporting process. The findings illuminate the importance of understanding the conflict between boards and CEOs by suggesting that a strong CEO's influence over a board may adversely affect the effectiveness of board oversight. The authors provide evidence that the DCF may target companies with strong CEOs and weak board monitoring for more intensive review. Second, the results imply that the discovery of the need to restate is different for DCF-instigated restatements. DCF-prompted restatements lead companies to re-evaluate their governance structure.

Cheng, X., L. Gao, J. E. Lawrence, and D. B. Smith. 2014. SEC Division of Corporation Finance Monitoring and CEO Power. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33 (1): 29-56.

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The evidence on the firm-to-firm spread of financial reporting behavior via board networks contributes to a little-studied area in accounting that should be important. The authors contribute to the corporate governance literature by offering evidence that contagion effects vary with board positions. They show that board supervision of management is important for ensuring high-quality financial reporting and that board linkages affect the success of this supervision. Regulators concerned about improving financial reporting quality should consider the board connectivity of companies.

Chiu, P. C., S. H. Teoh, and F. Tian. 2013. Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion. Accounting Review 88 (3): 915-944.

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The study highlights that a positive relationship between restatements and financial reporting quality depends on the reliable detection and disclosure of misstatements. Foreign firms are less likely to restate, a finding that has implications for investors and regulators. The results imply that U.S.-listed foreign firms may be under-scrutinized by U.S. public and private enforcement mechanisms. The findings suggest that companies from countries with weaker domestic rule of law are a potential focus area for investors and regulators to better identify firms with opportunistic restatement behavior. Fewer restatements lowers investors’ ability to hold managers and auditors accountable for poor financial reporting through CEO turnover or securities litigation, since restatements are a major trigger for both these mechanisms.

Srinivasan, S., Wahid, A. S., & Yu, G. 2015. Admitting Mistakes: Home Country Effect on the Reliability of Restatement Reporting. Accounting Review 90 (3): 1201-1240.

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The results suggest that explanatory language modifications, although less apparent than opinion qualifications, are informative of misstatement risk.  Under the present-day audit reporting requirements, auditors do communicate some risk-related information to financial statement users.  This finding had implications for standard-setters who are currently considering revising the audit reporting model to make future audit reports more informative.  The authors also highlight that auditors use unqualified audit reports to indicate heighted risk, building upon findings from prior research showing that auditors use going concern explanatory language to communicate risk.

Czerney, K., J. Schmidt, and A. Thompson. 2014. Does auditor explanatory language in unqualified audit reports indicate increased financial misstatement risk? The Accounting Review, 89 (6): 2115–2149.

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