The results of this study are important for firms to consider given the recent and historical problem of rising litigation costs. Firms are likely to be targets of lawsuits following the revelation of fraud within a client’s financial statements regardless of whether the firm was complicit in the fraud. Even lawsuits that are settled quickly result in high litigation costs, and the reputational costs to the firm can be just as problematic as the monetary costs. Very few audits are “perfect,” particularly when examined in hindsight. This study suggests that there are benefits to a firm being honest and apologetic about any deficiencies in an audit when the deficiencies do not relate to the fraud itself.

For more information on this study, please contact Jason Rasso.

Rasso, J. T. 2014. Apology accepted: The benefits of an apology for a deficient audit following an audit failure. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33 (1): 161-176.

This paper examines the use of an apology for conducting a deficient audit that indirectly leads to an audit failure. Audit failures can be costly to accounting firms in terms of litigation costs and reputational harm. These costs are potentially much higher when the audit failure stems from a deficient audit. The author tests whether the use of an apology containing various components (expression of sympathy, acceptance of responsibility, and/or promise to refrain) is beneficial or harmful to an accounting firm. The results reveal that only the expression of sympathy has an effect on assessments of punishment. However, combining all three apology components leads to a significantly higher perception of the accounting firm’s reputation. This paper is one of very few papers that examines mechanisms that can help protect firm’s reputations.

The research evidence is collected in the time period 2011 – 2012. The author collected responses from the general public via Amazon Mechanical Turk. The participants read about the history of an accounting firm, then read a newspaper article identifying a major accounting fraud in which the accounting firm is named as the auditor. The participants then read an apology that contains one, two, or all three of the apology components (one group does not read an apology) and then are asked to rate their support for a lawsuit against the firm, the level of fine they would recommend for the firm, and their perceptions of the firm’s reputation.

•  An apology containing only an expression of sympathy is the only version of an apology that results in lower support for a lawsuit and a lower fine recommendation when compared with the group that does not view an apology.
• There is a steady increase in perceptions of a firm’s reputation that can be seen as more components are added to an apology, with an apology containing all three components yielding the highest perception of the firm’s reputation.

http://www.auditingresearchsummaries.org

This study provides an important implication for audit firms in maintaining their worldwide brand name reputation. The results suggest that, for global audit firms, the damage to auditor reputation in one country may spill over and cause concern among investors about the quality of their services in other countries. Further, the damage to reputation is greater where the demand for auditing and assurance is higher.

Cahan, S. F., D. Emanuel, and J. Sun. 2009. Are the Reputations of the Large Accounting Firms Really International? Evidence from the Andersen-Enron Affair.  Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 28 (2):  199-226. 

The Big 4 accounting firms market themselves as global firms that deliver a uniform level of service across countries. While such a global reputation helps build worldwide demand for high-quality audits, it also creates risks if service quality becomes questionable in one of the countries in which a firm operates. Questionable audit practices in one of the countries, especially in the home jurisdiction, may  raise doubts as to whether sub-standard audits also occur in other countries. 

This study examines whether the damage to the name brand of Arthur Andersen following the Andersen-Enron scandal in the U.S. spilled over into other countries. The study focuses on two key event dates leading up to Andersen’s demise: (1) January 10, 2002, when Andersen announced it had shredded documents related to the Enron audit, and (2) February 4, 2002, when Enron’s board released the Powers report that was critical of Andersen and when Andersen announced the establishment of an Independent Oversight Board (IOB) to investigate the firm’s audit policies and procedures. This study investigates the market reaction to Andersen’s clientele base around these two dates to determine whether: 

• the events caused investors to reassess the reputation of Andersen’s non-U.S. audit units. 
• investors’ reevaluation of Andersen’s reputation is more pronounced in cases where there is a higher demand for audit quality or credible financial statements. 
• the effect is due to the perceived assurance or insurance value of an audit. The assurance value relates to an auditor’s ability to communicate with investors about the overall quality of client financial statements, while the insurance value relates to an auditor’s legal and financial liability for an audit failure.

The authors use data on publicly-traded companies audited by Arthur Andersen in 2001 to examine whether there is a negative market reaction to Andersen’s non-U.S. clients around the two event dates discussed above.

• The authors document that an adverse market reaction to Andersen’s clients exists in non-U.S. countries, which suggests that the damage to Andersen’s reputation and audit quality in the U.S. spilled over to other countries.  
• The market reaction is more negative in countries where there is a greater demand for high-quality auditing and credible financial reporting. More specifically, more-pronounced adverse market reactions are observed in common law (compared to code law) countries where investor protection is higher, ownership is more dispersed, and conflicts of interest between owners and managers are more likely to occur. 
• The authors find that the market reaction for the shredding event is more negative for Andersen’s non-U.S., cross-listed clients than for Andersen’s non-U.S., non-cross-listed clients. This suggests that the shredding event may have been anticipated by the U.S. market as triggering lawsuits against Andersen and reducing its ability to pay for possible legal claims. 
• The authors also report a similar market reaction for Andersen’s non-U.S., cross-listed clients and Andersen’s U.S. clients, suggesting similar levels of perceived audit quality across Andersen as a whole.

This study sheds light on why auditors choose to resign from auditing particular clients. The authors find that public information about audit risk, business risk, and litigation risk as well as private information about audit risk and business risk all play a role in the auditor’s resignation decision. This is useful for audit firms and regulators to consider. 

Ghosh, A. and C.Y. Tang. 2015. Auditor Resignation and Risk Factors. Accounting Horizons 29 (3): 529-549.

While prior research has suggested litigation risk as the main reason for auditor resignations, the competing explanations of audit risk and business risk have not been tested concurrently to discover their incremental importance. Furthermore, prior research has not been able to isolate the auditor’s private information from public information about these risks. The authors attempt to close this gap in the literature by studying whether and how much the auditor’s private information about future audit risk, business risk, and litigation risk impacts the auditor’s resignation decision.

The authors use data from publicly-traded companies that switched auditors during the 1999-2010 time period. First, they compare auditor resignations to auditor dismissals based on pre-switch audit risk, business risk, and litigation risk. Then they test whether auditor resignations predict post-switch audit risk (e.g. internal control problems), business risk (e.g. delisting from stock exchange), and litigation risk (e.g. class-action lawsuits).

• Compared to clients from which auditors have been dismissed, clients from which auditors resigned tend to have greater litigation risk, audit risk, and business risk before the change in auditors, but greater audit risk and business risk after the change.
• The litigation risk, business risk, and audit risk existing before an auditor chooses to resign from an engagement all impact the auditor’s resignation decision, with litigation risk having the largest impact and audit risk the smallest.
• Clients whose auditors have resigned are more likely to experience class-action lawsuits, internal control problems, and delisting from a stock exchange.
• Auditor resignations reveal no private information about future litigation risk.
• Auditor resignations reveal private information about future audit risk and future business risk, especially when one of the Big 4 audit firms resigned.

http://www.auditingresearchsummaries.org

The results of this study are important for audit firms to prepare for the adoption of IFRS and/or less precise standards under U.S. GAAP. The results indicate that a move to less precise standards will not necessarily result in more verdicts against auditors. There is only one condition in which an imprecise standard leads juries to return more verdicts against the auditor: when the client’s reporting complies with the precise standard and is inconsistent with the industry reporting norm. The results suggest that auditors can reduce this liability by ensuring that their client’s reporting is consistent with industry reporting norm.

For more information on this study, please contact Kathryn Kadous.
 

Kadous, K., and M. Mercer. 2012. Can Reporting Norms Create a Safe Harbor? Jury Verdicts against Auditors under Precise and Imprecise Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review 87 (2):565-587.

The transition from U.S. GAAP to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been a topic of debate among regulatory bodies, standard-setters, firms, and their auditors. IFRS tend to provide less precise guidance than current U.S. accounting standards, so their application requires more professional judgment. Auditors have expressed concern that the adoption of IFRS will result in increased legal liability. This paper addresses this concern by investigating how the level of precision in accounting standards affects jury verdicts in auditor negligence lawsuits. Based on legal studies and the psychology literature, this paper studies how the effect of accounting standard precision on jury verdicts depends on two factors:

• The aggressiveness of the audit client’s reporting choice
• Whether the audit client’s reporting choice is consistent with the industry reporting norm
   

The authors collected their evidence prior to September 2010.  They use a group of undergraduate students to act as jurors in a simulated auditor negligence case. The participants deliberate in juries of six persons. Each jury is asked to assess the auditor’s conduct and to provide a verdict.  

• The authors find that effect of accounting standard precision on jury verdicts depends on both the aggressiveness of the client’s reporting choice and on the industry reporting norm. Jurors use a hierarchy of decision rules. When the accounting standard does not provide a clear decision criterion, jurors seek other decision rules such as whether the client’s accounting is consistent with the industry reporting norm. 
• The authors find that when the client’s accounting is more aggressive and violates the precise standard, a majority of juries return verdicts against the auditor, regardless of whether the industry reporting norm is met. When the client’s reporting is less aggressive and does not violate the precise standard, juries rarely return verdicts against the auditor, regardless of whether the reporting is consistent with the industry reporting norm. 
• The authors find that when the accounting standard is imprecise, compliance with the industry reporting norm is a stronger predictor of jury verdicts. In particular, under the imprecise standard, no juries find against the auditor for allowing the more aggressive client reporting when the reporting is consistent with the industry reporting norm; when the reporting norm is violated, about half of the juries find the auditor negligent.
   

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The results should be of interest to auditing practitioners. Generally, managers of public companies prefer that the audit report does not contain a going concern paragraph. In this regard, researchers have found that issuing a going concern audit report increases the likelihood of management-initiated auditor switches. These results highlight the expected benefits to auditors from issuing a going concern report to their financially stressed clients. Specifically, better controlling for endogeneity, the evidence indicates that issuing a going concern report lowers the likelihood of investors naming the auditor in a class action lawsuit.

Kaplan, S. E., and D. D. Williams. 2013. Do Going Concern Audit Reports Protect Auditors from Litigation? A Simultaneous Equations Approach. Accounting Review 88 (1): 199-232.

An important aspect of the auditors’ environment is state and federal laws that allow third parties such as investors to sue auditors in an effort to recover damages. Historically, these litigation-related costs have been substantial. Potentially, auditors may be able to reduce their exposure to litigation when auditing a financially stressed client by issuing a going concern report. Under current auditing standards, a going concern audit report is required when an auditor has substantial doubt about the client’s ability to remain a going concern for a reasonable period of time. Whether a going concern report actually protects auditors against lawsuits is an open question.

The study applies a simultaneous equations approach to examine the relation between auditor going concern reporting and investors’ decisions to sue auditors. Importantly, this approach takes into account the endogeneity between the auditor’s going concern reporting decision and ex ante litigation risk. The authors explicitly recognize two separate aspects of the relation between going concern reporting and auditor litigation.

The sample consisted of 1,211 securities class action lawsuits filed against the auditors between 1986 and 2009. 147 firms comprise the final auditor litigation sample. The authors determined whether a securities class action lawsuit had been filed against the auditors by examining the databases constructed by Palmrose (1999), the Stanford Class Action Securities Clearinghouse, Audit Analytics, LexisNexis, Westlaw, CASEmaker, ISS Securities Class Action Services, and the popular press. 

• The evidence indicates that for auditors’ going concern reporting decisions as well as for investors’ decisions to sue auditors, the results differ between the two methods.
• While the relation between the risk of an auditor lawsuit and going concern reporting decisions is consistently positive, the lawsuit coefficient is larger and significant using simultaneous equations but insignificant using probit analysis.
• The results also show that the relation between going concern reports and investors’ lawsuit decisions is consistently negative.
• However, and perhaps more importantly, the going concern coefficient is larger and significant when using simultaneous equations but insignificant when using probit analysis. That is, the simultaneous equations results indicate that going concern reports significantly deter investors from suing auditors.
• The evidence showing that going concern reports deter investors from filing class action lawsuits against auditors is important, in that it suggests that going concern reports are useful to investors.
• When investors see a going concern report for financially stressed companies, they are less likely to sue the auditor for their investment losses.
• Issuing a going concern report offers the auditor protection against claims of negligence due to reporting, but not other claims of auditor negligence.

http://www.auditingresearchsummaries.org