This paper contains important applications for borrowing firms wanting to have more favorable loan contract terms. By hiring a high-quality auditor this decreases risks for the creditors and therefore oftentimes reduces the stringency of debt covenants. Subsequently, the borrowing firm will violate the debt covenants less.
Robin, Ashok, Q. Wu, and H. Zhang. 2017. “Auditor Quality and Debt Covenants”. Contemporary Accounting Research 34.1 (2017): 154.
Debt covenants are in place to help mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems between lender and borrower. This study examines whether high-quality auditors decrease the lenders’ demand for strict covenants (contracting effect), therefore reducing the likelihood of covenant violations (violation reduction effect). The assumption is that the information provided by a high-quality auditor would lower information asymmetry and agency problems, and consequently there would be no reason for strict debt covenants.
There was a sample of 35,181 observations from 1996-2007. Compustat was used to gather annual covenant-violation data and Deal Scan was used to gather U.S. loan facility information. The authors used an ordinary least squared (OLS) regression model in the analysis.
Overall, the authors find high-quality audits are in fact related with fewer and looser covenants in debt contracts.
Specifically, the authors find the following:
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This study makes important contributions regarding management’s disclosure of material weakness deficiencies. Currently, only audit-related risks are required to be addressed in material weakness deficiency disclosures. However, this study indicates that nonprofessional investors also take non-audit-related risks into consideration when making a financial reporting risk assessment. Managers do have the discretion to provide information about non-related audit risks through nonaudited disclosures. The authors suggest that in doing so managers can mitigate investors’ negative reaction the material weakness from lack of communication.
Asare, S. K., and A. M. Wright. 2017. Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material Weakness Disclosures. Behavioral Research In Accounting.
Material weakness disclosures, entity-level and account-specific, have a negative impact on nonprofessional investors financial reporting risk assessments. The authors define financial reporting risk as “an investor’s exposure to loss as a result of relying on audited financial reports generated from an ineffective ICOFR” for the purpose of the study. Prior studies have indicated that nonprofessional investors assess a higher financial reporting risk for entity-level material weakness disclosures compared to account-specific. Broadly, the primary purpose of this study is to examine audit-related and non-audit-related risks in explaining the relationship between the type of material weakness and the investor financial reporting risk assessment. The audit-related risks are as follows:
The non-audit-related risks are as follows:
Special attention in this paper is given to the relational effects between non-audit-related risks resulting from material weakness disclosures and nonprofessional investors financial reporting risk assessment.
The 181 participants in the study were all nonprofessional investors. Each participant received the following from a hypothetical company: general financial information, an audit report, and an adverse opinion on ICOFR, either on an entity-level or account-specific material weakness. Then participants were asked to evaluate the investment’s attractiveness and respond to several questions involving audit-related and non-audit-related risks. The authors used mediation analysis to evaluate the results.
The authors find the following:
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Sustainability is important to the accounting industry. Accountants have a responsibility to help integrate sustainability into areas such as budgets, resource allocations, and capital expenditure decisions. The evidence from this study indicates what CS activities consumer find important. Management can use this information in developing their business strategies related to CS.
Bradford, Marianne, J. B. Earp, D. S. Showalter, and P. F. Williams. 2017. “Corporate Sustainability Reporting and Stakeholder Concerns: Is There a Disconnect?”. Accounting Horizons. 31 (1): 83-102.
There has been an increasing number of companies reporting their corporate sustainability (CS) in recent years. Traditionally, CS refers to measures companies take against environmental issues. However, in recent years it is often viewed as the balance between environmental, social, and economic outcomes, also known as the triple bottom line. This expanded definition of CS has caused companies to emphasize different outcomes, and subsequently to have vastly different CS reports. The current guidelines for CS reporting, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework, is consistently updated to account for this expanded view. Additionally, consumers are increasingly being viewed as primary stakeholder groups. This study examines whether the CS information being reported through the GRI framework is adequately addressing consumer stakeholder interests.
The sample contained 505 participants that responded to an online survey in 2013. The link to the survey was posted on the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) website and also onto North Carolina State University’s website. The participants assumed the role of consumers and took the survey which contained 40 scale items and 6 demographic items.
The authors find the following:
This study provides empirical evidence that suggests that auditor ratification vote tallies are informative to the market. First, higher auditor ratification disapproval is associated with a more negative stock market reaction to the announcement of the vote tallies, consistent with the argument that this reflects negative investor perception of the auditor. Second, the authors provide evidence that the market reacts positively to an auditor change when there is high shareholder disapproval, and that audit and auditor characteristics moderate or exacerbate the market reaction in a way that suggests the market finds the ratification vote informative, but does not fully price it.
Tanyi, P. N. and K. C. Roland. 2017. Market Reaction to Auditor Ratification Vote Tally. Accounting Horizons 31 (1): 141 – 157.
In light of recent calls to mandate shareholder voting on auditor ratification, this paper illustrates that the ratification vote provides new information to investors. The push to mandate shareholder ratification is supported by many and is largely driven by concerns that most audit committees simply “rubber stamp” management’s recommendation of the auditor. Given that shareholder ratification votes are generally overwhelmingly in favor of the auditor, non-binding, and voluntary, the authors ask whether the market finds any new information in the ratification vote. The authors examine whether the proportion of votes against or abstaining from the appointment of the auditor has capital market consequences. They also examine whether the proportion of non-supporting votes affects how the market reacts to auditor dismissal.
The authors use a sample of firm-year observations with auditor ratification votes over the period of 2010 to 2015.
Prior research concerning audit fees and earnings management has focused primarily on accruals management. This article shows how the audit fee and audit risk models support auditors’ pricing behavior in a REM setting. Specifically, the results are consistent with auditors, after observing aggressive REM, increasing current audit fees to cover the cost of additional effort required to gain reasonable assurance that the financial statement are free of material misstatements and increase both current and future audit fees to cover increases in perceived business risk.
Greiner, A., M. J. Kohlbeck, and T. J. Smith. 2017. The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (1): 85 – 107.
The authors examine whether aggressive real earnings management (REM) activities are associated with audit fees. Prior research focuses on accruals-based earnings management and suggests that auditors extract additional audit fees to cover costs associated with increased engagement risk, which includes audit risks related to the issuance of an incorrect opinion and nonaudit risk related to impaired reputation, fewer business opportunities, and the inability to collect desires and future audit fees. The distinction between accrual and real earnings management is important for auditors because the potential effects on company performance and engagement risks are different. REM alters normal firm operations, impacts current and future cash flows, imposes additional costs, and sacrifices firm value. Whether auditors charge higher fees for earnings management behavior that does not violate generally accepted accounting principles if important to study as clients continue to pursue REM to meet reporting objectives.
The authors utilize a conceptual audit fee model to identify specific examples within this framework where REM is likely to increase engagement risk and thereby increase audit fees through either increased effort, a risk premium, or both. They perform further analysis to better understand the sources between aggressive REM and fees.
This study provides direct testing of the effects of two forms of CEO social influence pressure on actual CFO’s reporting decisions. Examining such pressures improves the overall understanding of an individual’s decision to engage in dysfunctional behavior, which can inform auditors and audit committee members who provide oversight of the financial reporting process and have responsibility for mitigating the risk of financial misreporting.
Bishop, C. C., F. T. DeZoort and D. R. Hermanson. 2017. The Effect of CEO Social Influence Pressure and CFO Accounting Experience on CFO Financial Reporting Decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (1): 21 – 41.
CFOs play critical stewardship roles related to financial reporting quality and a prominent and increasing role in accounting manipulations, particularly in conjunction with their CEO. This study examines how CEO pressure on the CFO and CFO accounting experience influence public company CFOs’ financial reporting judgments and decisions.
The authors conducted an experiment involving a hypothetical CFO’s earnings manipulation decision. Using a between-subjects manipulation, they utilize three levels of CEO pressure (a control group where the CEO does not pressure the CFO, a compliance pressure group where the CEO asks the CFO to revise an estimate, and an obedience pressure group where the CEO tells the CFO to revise an estimate).
This study indicates that increasing the frequency of informal communication between the audit committee and the audit team can positively impact reporting quality, but auditors need to be sensitized to how management may exhibit undue influence and its potential to undermine audit committee effectiveness. From a practical standpoint, this study indicates that failing to consider specific expectations communicated by the audit committee can have severe consequences.
Brown, J. O. and V. K. Popova. 2016. The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee Communication on Auditor Judgment. Behavioral Research in Accounting 28 (1): 27-40.
Over the past two decades, the audit committee has evolved from a passive observer to a critical player in ensuring quality financial reporting. Just recently, the PCAOB approved Auditing Standard No. 16 to enhance communication between the external auditor and the audit committee in order to better facilitate the audit committee’s oversight role and improve financial reporting quality. However, despite this reform, auditors continue to harp on the importance of management’s role in corporate governance and its ability to exhibit significant influence during the audit. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to examine the interplay of management and the audit committee on auditor judgment, and whether auditor’s sensitivity to a characteristic of management, its incentive to influence the auditor, moderates the effectiveness of additional oversight by the audit committee. It is also important to examine whether auditors are effectively integrating expressed expectations voiced by the audit committee, in light of the recent passage of AS No. 16.
The authors administered a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment that required audit seniors to evaluate management’s estimate for obsolete inventory. The auditors either were or were not given additional communication from the audit committee of its expectations. Management’s incentives to influence the auditor were also manipulated by varying the perceived propensity to manage earnings.
This study provides evidence that reporting openness can have the unintended effect of increasing collusion. Recognizing that reporting openness can have a downside can help executives make more informed decisions when considering how much organizational openness they want. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that, despite increasing trust and reciprocity among managers, open internal reporting can potentially result in more managerial collusion because openness fosters greater “honor among thieves.”
Evans III, J. H., D. V. Moser, A. H. Newman, and B. R. Stikeleather. 2016. Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (4): 1375-1402.
The authors examine whether open internal reporting, in which a manager observes another manager’s communications with senior executives, increases collusion between the managers. Open internal reporting environments certainly have benefits, but they can also expose firms to collusion, which is a significant control problem for firms. For this reason, documenting how open internal reporting affects managers’ collusion is important because the related insight can help top executives decide how much internal reporting openness they want in their firm.
The authors use an experiment to examine the effect of reporting openness of misreporting and collusion because an experiment allows them to control the managers’ economic incentives and also to isolate the effect of social norms on managers’ behavior.
This study helps to clarify the conditions under which employers are most likely to benefit economically from offering their workers an explicit financial reward for reporting internal misconduct. His cost-benefit analysis reveals that offering a financial reward is likely to be most cost-effective when the existing rate of whistleblowing within the firm is low and least-cost effective when it is high. Furthermore, employers who pay relatively low wages and/or whose workers have weak ethical incentives to report internal misconduct are likely to gain the most economic benefit from offering a reward.
Stikeleather, B. R. 2016. When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct? Accounting, Organizations and Society 52: 1 – 14.
Many employers incur significant economic losses from internal misconduct, such as stealing inventory, falsifying time records, or operating equipment under the influence of drugs or alcohol. As a result, employers are attempting to find a solution to combat this misconduct. One solution that has arisen is offering workers an explicit financial reward for reporting internal misconduct; however, no consensus exists on whether or when this approach should be used. This study seeks to clarify the matter by identifying organizational factors that help determine whether an employer will benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct. Specifically, the author investigates whether the level of workers’ fixed compensation and their moral convictions influence their whistleblowing decisions and whether variation in these two key organizational factors moderates the cost-effectiveness for offering financial rewards for internal whistleblowing.
To test his hypothesis, the author runs an experiment consisting of three between-subjects conditions.
The results of this study suggest that, while both types of incentive schemes are effective in promoting whistle-blowing behavior in the absence of close working relationships, the effectiveness of a rewarding incentive scheme is more likely to be undermined by the presence of close working relationships than a penalizing incentive scheme.
Boo, E., T. B. Ng, and P. G. Shankar. 2016. Effects of Incentive Scheme and Working Relationship on Whistle-Blowing in an Audit Setting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (4): 23 – 38.
Prior research shows that providing an incentive, either in the form of a reward or a penalty, can help promote whistle-blowing behavior. Other studies show that close relationships between employees can exert a negative impact on whistle-blowing behavior. An important yet unanswered question is whether and to what extent the effectiveness of different types of incentive schemes to promote whistle-blowing could be undermined by the presence of close working relationships likely to be forged among team members in audit firms and other organizations. Furthermore, the current incentive system in the auditing profession is dominated by penalties; however, many are calling for a shift toward incorporating more ways to reward auditors rather than penalize them, suggesting the importance of understanding the implications of alternative incentive systems. Also, there has not been much research done on the effectiveness of punitive schemes, despite their prevalence in the profession. Finally, whistle-blowing has been found to be a significant means by which frauds and other forms of misconduct are detected, which suggests the crucial importance of understanding factors that could enhance or undermine its effectiveness.
The authors conduct an experiment involving 90 auditors from a Big 4 firm in Singapore. The participants are presented with a hypothetical scenario in which an audit manager encountered a wrongdoing by the engagement partner who allowed the client to materially misstate sales revenue, and assess their propensity to report the act through the firm’s whistle-blowing hotline after making no headway despite having voiced concerns to the partner.