Auditing Section Research Summaries Space

A Database of Auditing Research - Building Bridges with Practice

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  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Auditor Quality and Debt Covenants
    research summary posted June 26, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 14.0 Corporate Matters 
    Title:
    Auditor Quality and Debt Covenants
    Practical Implications:

    This paper contains important applications for borrowing firms wanting to have more favorable loan contract terms. By hiring a high-quality auditor this decreases risks for the creditors and therefore oftentimes reduces the stringency of debt covenants. Subsequently, the borrowing firm will violate the debt covenants less.

    Citation:

    Robin, Ashok, Q. Wu, and H. Zhang. 2017. “Auditor Quality and Debt Covenants”. Contemporary Accounting Research 34.1 (2017): 154.

    Home:

    http://commons.aaahq.org/groups/e5075f0eec/summary

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material...
    research summary posted June 22, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 06.0 Risk and Risk Management, Including Fraud Risk, 14.0 Corporate Matters 
    Title:
    Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material Weakness Disclosures
    Practical Implications:

    This study makes important contributions regarding management’s disclosure of material weakness deficiencies. Currently, only audit-related risks are required to be addressed in material weakness deficiency disclosures. However, this study indicates that nonprofessional investors also take non-audit-related risks into consideration when making a financial reporting risk assessment. Managers do have the discretion to provide information about non-related audit risks through nonaudited disclosures. The authors suggest that in doing so managers can mitigate investors’ negative reaction the material weakness from lack of communication.

    Citation:

    Asare, S. K., and A. M. Wright. 2017. Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material Weakness Disclosures. Behavioral Research In Accounting

    Home:

    http://commons.aaahq.org/groups/e5075f0eec/summary

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Corporate Sustainability Reporting and Stakeholder Concerns:...
    research summary posted June 22, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 14.0 Corporate Matters, 15.0 International Matters, 15.05 Sustainability Services 
    Title:
    Corporate Sustainability Reporting and Stakeholder Concerns: Is There a Disconnect?
    Practical Implications:

    Sustainability is important to the accounting industry. Accountants have a responsibility to help integrate sustainability into areas such as budgets, resource allocations, and capital expenditure decisions. The evidence from this study indicates what CS activities consumer find important. Management can use this information in developing their business strategies related to CS. 

    Citation:

    Bradford, Marianne, J. B. Earp, D. S. Showalter, and P. F. Williams. 2017. “Corporate Sustainability Reporting and Stakeholder Concerns: Is There a Disconnect?”. Accounting Horizons. 31 (1): 83-102.

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Market Reaction to Auditor Ratification Vote Tally
    research summary posted April 19, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.11 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
    Title:
    Market Reaction to Auditor Ratification Vote Tally
    Practical Implications:

    This study provides empirical evidence that suggests that auditor ratification vote tallies are informative to the market. First, higher auditor ratification disapproval is associated with a more negative stock market reaction to the announcement of the vote tallies, consistent with the argument that this reflects negative investor perception of the auditor. Second, the authors provide evidence that the market reacts positively to an auditor change when there is high shareholder disapproval, and that audit and auditor characteristics moderate or exacerbate the market reaction in a way that suggests the market finds the ratification vote informative, but does not fully price it. 

    Citation:

    Tanyi, P. N. and K. C. Roland. 2017. Market Reaction to Auditor Ratification Vote Tally. Accounting Horizons 31 (1): 141 – 157. 

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management...
    research summary posted April 19, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 10.0 Engagement Management, 10.06 Audit Fees and Fee Negotiations, 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.01 Earnings Management 
    Title:
    The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees
    Practical Implications:

    Prior research concerning audit fees and earnings management has focused primarily on accruals management. This article shows how the audit fee and audit risk models support auditors’ pricing behavior in a REM setting. Specifically, the results are consistent with auditors, after observing aggressive REM, increasing current audit fees to cover the cost of additional effort required to gain reasonable assurance that the financial statement are free of material misstatements and increase both current and future audit fees to cover increases in perceived business risk.     

    Citation:

    Greiner, A., M. J. Kohlbeck, and T. J. Smith. 2017. The Relationship between Aggressive Real Earnings Management and Current and Future Audit Fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (1): 85 – 107. 

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    The Effect of CEO Social Influence Pressure and CFO...
    research summary posted April 19, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.05 Earnings Targets and Management Behavior, 14.06 CFO Tenure and Experience 
    Title:
    The Effect of CEO Social Influence Pressure and CFO Accounting Experience on CFO Financial Reporting Decisions
    Practical Implications:

    This study provides direct testing of the effects of two forms of CEO social influence pressure on actual CFO’s reporting decisions. Examining such pressures improves the overall understanding of an individual’s decision to engage in dysfunctional behavior, which can inform auditors and audit committee members who provide oversight of the financial reporting process and have responsibility for mitigating the risk of financial misreporting. 

    Citation:

    Bishop, C. C., F. T. DeZoort and D. R. Hermanson. 2017. The Effect of CEO Social Influence Pressure and CFO Accounting Experience on CFO Financial Reporting Decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (1): 21 – 41.

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee...
    research summary posted November 15, 2016 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 13.0 Governance, 13.05 Board/Audit Committee Oversight, 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.11 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
    Title:
    The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee Communication on Auditor Judgment
    Practical Implications:

    This study indicates that increasing the frequency of informal communication between the audit committee and the audit team can positively impact reporting quality, but auditors need to be sensitized to how management may exhibit undue influence and its potential to undermine audit committee effectiveness. From a practical standpoint, this study indicates that failing to consider specific expectations communicated by the audit committee can have severe consequences.

    Citation:

    Brown, J. O. and V. K. Popova. 2016. The Interplay of Management Incentives and Audit Committee Communication on Auditor Judgment.  Behavioral Research in Accounting 28 (1): 27-40.

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial...
    research summary posted February 20, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 14.0 Corporate Matters 
    Title:
    Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion
    Practical Implications:

    This study provides evidence that reporting openness can have the unintended effect of increasing collusion.  Recognizing that reporting openness can have a downside can help executives make more informed decisions when considering how much organizational openness they want. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that, despite increasing trust and reciprocity among managers, open internal reporting can potentially result in more managerial collusion because openness fosters greater “honor among thieves.”

    Citation:

    Evans III, J. H., D. V. Moser, A. H. Newman, and B. R. Stikeleather. 2016. Honor Among Thieves: Open Internal Reporting and Managerial Collusion. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (4): 1375-1402.

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial...
    research summary posted February 20, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.02 Corporate Whistle Blowers 
    Title:
    When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct?
    Practical Implications:

    This study helps to clarify the conditions under which employers are most likely to benefit economically from offering their workers an explicit financial reward for reporting internal misconduct. His cost-benefit analysis reveals that offering a financial reward is likely to be most cost-effective when the existing rate of whistleblowing within the firm is low and least-cost effective when it is high. Furthermore, employers who pay relatively low wages and/or whose workers have weak ethical incentives to report internal misconduct are likely to gain the most economic benefit from offering a reward. 

    Citation:

    Stikeleather, B. R. 2016. When do employers benefit from offering workers a financial reward for reporting internal misconduct? Accounting, Organizations and Society 52: 1 – 14. 

  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Effects of Incentive Scheme and Working Relationship on...
    research summary posted January 12, 2017 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 04.06 Reporting Ethics Breaches – Self & Others, 14.0 Corporate Matters, 14.02 Corporate Whistle Blowers 
    Title:
    Effects of Incentive Scheme and Working Relationship on Whistle-Blowing in an Audit Setting
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study suggest that, while both types of incentive schemes are effective in promoting whistle-blowing behavior in the absence of close working relationships, the effectiveness of a rewarding incentive scheme is more likely to be undermined by the presence of close working relationships than a penalizing incentive scheme. 

    Citation:

    Boo, E., T. B. Ng, and P. G. Shankar. 2016. Effects of Incentive Scheme and Working Relationship on Whistle-Blowing in an Audit Setting. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (4): 23 – 38. 

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