The results of the studies documented in this review suggest that there is a great deal of variability in the approaches taken by firms for establishing materiality. Such differences in materiality methods can affect both the effectiveness and efficiency of audits. For example, if firms differ in how they allocate materiality to financial statement accounts, then the scope of the work could differ across audits with similar characteristics. Auditors also appear to differ in terms of the factors they consider for determining the materiality of internal control weaknesses, suggesting that auditors may need more structured criteria to make materiality judgments about internal control weaknesses. Materiality judgments are influenced by authoritative guidance, suggesting that standard setters and audit firms have the ability to influence auditors’ materiality judgments by providing auditors with specific guidance.

Messier, Jr., W.F., N. Martinov-Bennie, and A. Eilifsen. 2005. A review and integration of empirical research on materiality: Two decades later. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 24 (2): 153-187.

Firms should consider the levels of accountability pressure and situations where they use them and consider how different levels of pressure may impact performance.  Higher levels of accountability pressure may increase effectiveness and increase the likelihood of finding material misstatements. 

On the other hand, increased effectiveness and time spent due to higher levels of accountability pressure may cause inefficiencies and result in unnecessary effort.  Firms should evaluate the costs and benefits for their situations. 

The authors note that this study only looks at the effect of accountability pressure from an unknown partner.  In the real world, auditors have accountability pressures from many levels such as other superiors, clients, regulators, and audit committees. 
Further, the auditor may have assessed things differently if they knew the partner that was performing their review.

DeZoort, T., P. Harrison, and M. Taylor. 2006.  Accountability and auditors’ materiality judgments: The effects of differential pressure strength on conservatism, variability, and effort.  Accounting, Organizations, and Society 31 (4-5):  373-390. 

At its core, the theory proposed by the authors assumes that auditors are economic agents who provide a valuable service and can be expected to behave rationally to maximize their profits. Strategic behaviors such as under-auditing, over-auditing, or overbilling would be unobservable by an auditee in many instances. The possibility of such behaviors has important implications for the level of assurance over financial reports and can potentially affect the efficient allocation of capital resources. One of the goals of this study was to analyze how the credence aspect of audits could influence important policy decisions. Regulation may play a powerful role in mitigating the credence nature of auditing, e.g., PCAOB inspections. However, regulation can be a double-edged sword if it increases the incentive or opportunity for auditors to behave strategically. Therefore, auditors can take the theories and models presented in this study to evaluate their firms for potential profit maximizing biases that may negatively impact audit quality and efficiency. Policy makers could also use these theories and models to evaluate how new auditing policies might influence auditors’ incentives and behaviors.

For more information on this study, please contact W. Robert Knechel.
 

Causholli, M., and W. R. Knechel. 2012. An Examination of the Credence Attributes of an Audit. Accounting Horizons 26(4): 631-656.

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The results should be of interest to auditing standard setters who provide guidance on the evaluation of control deficiencies as part of an integrated audit. Further, regulators inspecting public company audits may want to further review settings where control deficiencies were not evaluated as material weaknesses and assess whether the presence/absence of a financial statement misstatement was appropriately considered. The findings provide a more complete understanding of how the factors that auditors encounter during the audit engagement influence their judgment about whether identified deficiencies in ICFR are such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis (i.e., material weakness).

Gramling, A. A., E. F. O'Donnell, and S. D. Vandervelde. 2013. An Experimental Examination of Factors That Influence Auditor Assessments of a Deficiency in Internal Control over Financial Reporting. Accounting Horizons 27 (2): 249-269.

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