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  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Industry Audit Experts and Ownership Structure in the...
    research summary posted March 2, 2015 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.04 Industry Experience 
    Title:
    Industry Audit Experts and Ownership Structure in the Syndicated Loan Market: At the Firm and Partner Levels
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study are important for the PCAOB and other regulatory bodies tasked with considering the economic consequences of requiring an audit partner signature. The motivation behind the PCAOB’s proposal for the signature and disclosure is to increase transparency for interested parties who rely on the financial statements and accountability on the part of the audit partner. In this research, the authors focus on one important interested party, namely lenders, and find that lenders value industry audit experts at the partner level when structuring the ownership of syndicate loans. The findings add to the intense debate on the merits of the PCAOB’s proposal and can be helpful for regulators. The study also provides some evidence that industry audit expertise is viewed as a useful mechanism that mitigates information asymmetry problems faced by lenders in a syndicated loan.

    For more information on this study, please contact Wei-Ren Yao.

    Citation:

    Chin, C.L., W.R. Yao and P.Y. Liu. 2014. Industry Audit Experts and Ownership Structure in the Syndicated Loan Market: At the Firm and Partner Levels. Accounting Horizons 28(4):749-768

    Keywords:
    Partner-level audit expertise; firm-level audit expertise; syndicated loan; ownership structure.
    Purpose of the Study:
    • In 2009 and 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued two successive releases that seek feedback on the proposal that requires audit firms to disclose the name of engagement partner in standard audit report. The rationale behind the PCAOB’s proposal is that the signature and disclosure requirements can increase transparency and audit partner accountability and, in turn, result in enhanced audit quality. To understand the economic consequences of this requirement further, the authors explores whether industry audit expertise at the partner level is valued by stakeholders, i.e. lenders in the syndicated loan market.
    • In contrast to prior empirical studies on the effect of partner-level industry expertise on audit fees and audit quality, the authors provide further supporting evidence that partner-level industry expertise is valued by stakeholders, consistent with the PCAOB’s argument that the signature and disclosure requirements increase transparency regarding the engagement partner’s identity and, in turn, create an opportunity for the general public (e.g., lenders) to evaluate the engagement partner’s experience and track record (PCAOB 2011, 6).
    • Private loan has become the largest source of worldwide corporate financing; however, little work to date explores the role of audit quality, especially the effectiveness of industry expertise at individual partner level, on mitigating agency cost and reducing information asymmetry between the contracting parties from the viewpoint of debt holders.
    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The research data are collected from a unique sample of listed firms in Taiwan that have syndicated loan data in the 1992-2010 time periods. The audit report in Taiwan is issued in the name of two signing auditors, as well as the audit firm, which provide us with an opportunity to examine whether industry audit experts at the partner level are valued by stakeholders. The impacts of industry audit experts at the individual level on the ownership structure in the syndicated loan are examined using statistical analysis.

    Findings:
    • The authors find that partner-level industry audit experts, either alone or in conjunction with firm-level industry audit experts, are associated with a lower share held by lead arrangers.
    • The authors find that the number of lenders in general (or the number of foreign lenders in particular) in a loan is the largest when borrowers retain industry audit experts at both the firm- and partner-levels.
    • The authors also find that firms audited by industry audit expertise are more likely to gain a larger amount of loan than those retaining non-expertise.
    • These findings suggest that lenders in the syndicated loan market consider part of auditors’ expertise, despite residing within the same audit firm, not to be transferable and homogeneous across individual partners.
    Category:
    Audit Quality & Quality Control, Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Impact of PCAOB, Industry Expertise – Firm and Individual
  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    PCAOB Quality Control Inspection Reports and Auditor...
    research summary posted February 15, 2015 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.11 Impact of Firm and External Inspection Programs 
    Title:
    PCAOB Quality Control Inspection Reports and Auditor Reputation
    Practical Implications:

    The results of this study are important in considering what should be produced from PCAOB inspections of audit firms. Evidence indicates that clients use the information provided by Part II of the PCAOB inspection reports to choose a high quality audit firm. Perhaps producing a quality control report with every PCAOB inspection report would be helpful to clients in analyzing the audit firm and potentially improving overall audit quality.

    For further information on this study, please contact Albert L. Nagy.

    Citation:

    Nagy, Albert L. 2014. PCAOB Quality Control Inspection Reports and Auditor Reputation. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33 (3): 87-104.

    Keywords:
    audit quality signals, PCAOB inspections, quality controls
    Purpose of the Study:

    This study focuses on the informational value of the quality control criticisms disclosed in Part II of PCAOB inspection reports. Part II of the report becomes public only if a firm fails to satisfactorily remediate the quality control deficiencies within a 12-month period. This study examines the change in audit firms' market share following the public disclosure of Part II. The results show that audit firms lose a significant amount of market share following the public disclosure of quality control criticisms, and suggest such a disclosure provides a credible signal of auditor quality to audit clients.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    Firms analyzed were United States based, non-dark audit firms included in the Audit Analytics database from 2007 to 2012. All firms were inspected by the PCAOB and reports were posted on the PCAOB website. The market share changes for the quality control (QC) report release were measured for the year immediately following the public disclosure of the QC report. The non-QC report observations’ market changes were measured for the calendar years of the sample period.  The sampled observations were used to estimate an OLS regression model to determine whether QC reports have an effect on changes of audit firms’ market share.  

    Findings:

    The regression results of this study show that audit firms associated with publicly disclosed QC reports lose a greater amount of market share in the subsequent year than those firms not associated with a QC report. These results suggest that audit clients associate QC reports as a credible signal of low audit quality and, thus, are less likely to retain and hire audit firms involved with such a report. 

    Category:
    Audit Quality & Quality Control, Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Impact of Firm & External Inspection Programs, Impact of PCAOB
  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Are PCAOB-Identified Audit Deficiencies Associated with a...
    research summary posted November 10, 2014 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 09.0 Auditor Judgment, 09.04 Going Concern Decisions 
    Title:
    Are PCAOB-Identified Audit Deficiencies Associated with a Change in Reporting Decisions of Triennially Inspected Audit Firms?
    Practical Implications:

    Our findings seem to support statements made by the PCAOB regarding the usefulness of the inspection process in changing audit firm behavior.

    The change in GC reporting decisions that we find suggests either (1) an increased conservatism following a PCAOB inspection, of the audit firm on important reporting issues, and/or (2) an increased level of competence brought to the reporting decision.

    It is important to note that we find no change in the accuracy of the GC opinions, as measured by the future bankruptcy (or not) for clients that received a GC opinion.

    For more information on this study, please contact Jayanthi Krishnan.

    Citation:

    Gramling, A.A., J. Krishnan and Y. Zhang. 2011. Are PCAOB-Identified Audit Deficiencies Associated with a Change in Reporting Decisions of Triennially Inspected Audit Firms? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 30 (3): 59-79.

    Keywords:
    PCAOB inspection reports; going-concern; audit deficiencies.
    Purpose of the Study:

    At a broad level, we are obtaining evidence on whether the PCAOB inspection process is associated with changes in auditor behavior. More specifically, we examine whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies are associated with a change in triennially inspected audit firms’ going concern (GC) reporting decisions for their financially distressed clients. 

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    We obtained PCAOB inspection reports, dated between 01/01/2005 and 12/31/2007, from the PCAOB website. These reports covered PCAOB inspections of audits completed by the audit firms during 2004-2007. For the audit firms included in the sample, we read the inspection reports to identify those that indicated audit deficiencies. Data on GC opinions were obtained from Audit Analytics. The final sample on which we base our results consists of 202 audit firms and 1,648 client-year observations. The sample clients are distributed across a wide spectrum of industries, with over 50 two-digit SIC industries represented.

    Findings:
    • Firms with PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies were more likely to issue GC opinions for financially distressed clients subsequent to their PCAOB inspection than prior to their inspections.
    • While there was a change in behavior, the change does not suggest an improvement in reducing Type I errors (i.e., issuing a GC opinion to clients that subsequently remain viable) or Type II errors (i.e., failure to issue a GC opinion to a client that subsequently declares bankruptcy). Additional analysis indicates no systematic change in Type I and Type II errors following the issuance of a PCAOB report.
    • We find limited evidence of a change in the likelihood of issuing a GC opinion for audit firms that had no PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies. This finding suggests that the inspection reports without identified audit deficiencies have some, but limited, impact on changing audit firm behavior.
    Category:
    Auditor Judgment, Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Going Concern Decisions, Going Concern Decisions, Impact of PCAOB
  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an...
    research summary posted October 27, 2014 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 04.0 Independence and Ethics, 04.08 Impact of SEC Rules Changes/SarbOx 
    Title:
    Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an ‘‘innovation’’ in the regulatory space
    Practical Implications:

    This study shows that in practice the independent regulatory bodies implemented after the scandal of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Anderson are influenced by the accounting profession, despite their claim of independence. The Big Four firms are exerting a great influence on them, while the interest of the public only takes a small place in the discussion. Regulatory regimes thus face the challenge to ensure that the institutions they created fulfill the role they were given.

     

    For more information on this study, please contact Bertrand Malsch. 

    Citation:

    Malsch, B. and Y. Gendron. 2011. Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space. Accounting, Organizations and Society 36 (7): 456-476.

    Keywords:
    Dynamics of power, independent audit regulators, arm’s length regulation, outside monitoring, tradition of self-regulation, Canadian Public Accountability Board
    Purpose of the Study:

    In the past, auditors largely self-regulated and were subject to peer reviews.  In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions have been created to oversee financial auditing. Accounting firms are now accountable to regulatory organizations localized outside the boundaries of the profession’s jurisdictional domain.

     

    First, the authors investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulatory field of public accounting. They were especially interested in examining which organizations gained, maintained or lost their position of power in the regulatory space under study, and the extent to which the new regulatory practices were consistent with the independent regulator’s claim of “outside monitoring”. The authors’ analysis is also directed at the exercise of power and influence in the globalized audit regulatory space.

     

    Second, they extend the boundaries of their argument by showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. The analysis provides some insights into the dynamics of power which the creation of independent audit regulators engendered in other spaces, and the collaborative processes taking place across networks of regulators in trying to ensure that their mandates and practices are coherent and consistent.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The empirical material relates to a specific time frame, from the establishment of CPAB in 2003 until year 2009.  The following sources of information have been used: public statements issued by a number of independent audit regulators and regulatory agencies, internal documents, documents retracing the public consultation process initiated in June 2003 on regulatory project 52-108 regarding the creation of CPAB, and minutes of all meetings held between 2005 and 2009 by two agencies set up by the European commission. Two rounds of semi-structured interviews were conducted.  The first round of interviews, carried out from 2003 to 2005 mostly in Canada, consists of more than 60 interviews with audit committee members, financial analysts, financial auditors, regulators, etc. Two of these interviews take on special significance retrospectively in the context of the study: one with the first chief executive officer (CEO) of CPAB, and the other with a member of CPAB’s board of directors. The second round involves seven interviews conducted in 2008–2009 in Europe. The second-round interviews involve three high-ranking partners of the Big Four, as well as one board member and three executives from independent audit regulatory organizations.

    Findings:
    • The authors find that the accounting profession is resistant to the establishment of an independent regulatory organization. The logic of self regulation in the profession influences the new regulatory organization significantly, in spite of the efforts of a number of non accounting organizations to constrain the influence of the accounting establishment and its key allies in reshaping regulation in accordance with their interests. 
    • The authors find that the regulator is influenced partially in practice by a private circuit of power. The targets of regulation, especially the Big Four firms, are powerful in the face of audit regulators.
    • The authors find that there is a major regulatory gap where both the international firms and the global standard-setting bodies are not subject to global and strong regulatory oversight.
    • The authors find that the patterns of resistance to the logic of arm’s length regulation are influential across a number of jurisdictions. Of course, the degree of influence varies in time and space.
    • The authors find that the ‘public’ is often a marginal figure in the discourses constructed by the actors studied. 
    Category:
    Independence & Ethics, Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Impact of PCAOB, Impact of SEC Rules Changes/SarBox
  • Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips
    PCAOB Inspections and Large Accounting Firms
    research summary posted September 17, 2013 by Jennifer M Mueller-Phillips, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.11 Impact of Firm and External Inspection Programs 
    Title:
    PCAOB Inspections and Large Accounting Firms
    Practical Implications:

    Auditors should be interested in the results of this paper because the trends provide information both on emerging issues in accounting, as well as areas that are likely to be flagged by the PCAOB for inspection. For example, issues related to fair value measurement are growing as a percentage of overall issues. This may cause audit firms to examine their fair value accounting practices and training.

    For more information on this study, please contact Bryan K. Church.
     

    Citation:

    Church, B. K., and Shefchik, L. B. 2012. PCAOB Inspections and Large Accounting Firms. Accounting Horizons 26 (1): 43-63.

    Keywords:
    PCAOB inspections; inspection reports; regulation; audit quality.
    Purpose of the Study:

    This article gathers data from PCAOB inspection results and analyzes that data to determine trends in the auditing field. It presents these trends in a way that should be of interest to regulators, academics, practicing accountants, and users of the PCAOB's inspection reports.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    Using PCAOB inspection reports from 2005 through 2010, the results of each inspection report is manually coded into different categories. Then, using linear regression, the article determines trends of interest in the audit engagements of the big four accounting firms as well as the four other annually inspected accounting firms.

    Findings:

    The article finds a number of trends, but some of the more important ones are:

    • Issues related to fair value measurement are growing as a percentage of overall issues
    • Total issues are declining
    • Revenue recognition is the most common problem area
       
    Category:
    Audit Quality & Quality Control, Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Impact of Firm & External Inspection Programs, Impact of PCAOB
  • The Auditing Section
    The Global Audit Profession and the International Financial...
    research summary posted May 4, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.02 Changes in Audit Standards, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB 
    Title:
    The Global Audit Profession and the International Financial Architecture: Understanding Regulatory Relationships at a Time of Financial Crisis
    Practical Implications:

    This paper provides insight into the effect of the global financial crisis on auditors and the relationships between large international accounting firms, regulators, and standard setters. The paper summarizes a variety of reports and policy proposals related to the global financial crisis, including the number of times auditors are mentioned in each of the reports. The paper discusses issues related to bank audits, including discussion of fair value issues and going concern reports.

    Citation:

    Humphrey, C., A. Loft and M. Woods. 2009. The Global Audit Profession and the International Financial Architecture: Understanding Regulatory Relationships at a Time of Financial Crisis. Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (6-7): 810-825.

    Keywords:
    International auditing, standard setting, auditing interpretations, global audit regulation, audit committees, accountant independence, global financial crisis, and international federation of accountants
    Purpose of the Study:

    The global financial crisis of 2008 resulted in multiple bank failings, some with little to no warning from auditors. However, auditors have largely stayed out of the discussions of what went wrong to cause the global financial crisis. This paper takes a look at the potential effects the global financial crisis could have on the auditing profession. Specifically, the paper notes: 

    • The importance of viewing auditing from a global context Regulatory response to the global financial crisis and how new regulations affect auditing
    • The potential future of bank auditing 

    This paper also explores the relationships between the international audit firms, regulators, and standard setters.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    This paper provides the authors’ commentary on the global financial crisis and discusses some reports and policy proposals that resulted from the financial crisis.

    Findings:
    • The paper notes that although auditors have not been questioned extensively regarding their role in the global financial crisis, some new policy initiatives and reports have mentioned the auditing profession.
    • The paper suggests that in solving the global financial crisis, it is important for auditors, regulators, standard setters, and others to work together.
    • The paper notes that it is important to consider the audit profession on a global basis.
    • The authors challenge the industry to make the knowledge related to international audit practice, regulatory networks and the forces driving the same more accessible.
    Category:
    Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Changes in Audit Standards, Impact of PCAOB
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  • The Auditing Section
    Auditor Standard Setting and Inspection for U.S. Public...
    research summary posted April 13, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.05 Impact of SOX, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB 
    Title:
    Auditor Standard Setting and Inspection for U.S. Public Companies:
    Practical Implications:

    The authors hope to generate discussion and reform of accounting and auditing regulation, specifically with respect to the PCAOB, based upon the observations and points below. 

    • The authors believe that the audit “profession lost sight of its core values such as independence, high-quality audits, and responsibility to the public trust.  …in many ways, SOX led to a justified back-to-basics focus within the largest international accounting firms.”
    • Under the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), the United States was the global leader in auditing standard-setting.  There are currently three sets of auditing standards that may govern an audit:  the ASB, the PCAOB and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). 
    • Auditors of publicly held companies will continue to audit against audit standards sponsored by several different standard setters in efforts to conduct high quality audits. Audit quality will continue to be a high priority of regulators and the firm’s quality control functions.  Coordinating the various standard setters’ requirements into a single quality control system for firms will be a challenge.
    • In an effort to increase independence of standard-setting from the audit profession, the PCAOB has adopted a non-expert model.  The resulting standards may be costly and of poor quality.
      • PCAOB inspections are not able to conduct risk-based inspections.
      • Inspection reports do not adequately distinguish between trivial and significant findings for the public to understand whether the audit itself is of adequate quality.
      • Inspection reports are issued so late as to be of little value in the subsequent audit.
    • The PCAOB should reconsider its standard-setting and inspection processes.
      • Standard-setting should be better aligned with the process of financial accounting standards.  Specifically, the standards should be set by the profession with oversight by the PCAOB.  The analogy is that FASB sets the accounting standards with oversight by the SEC.  Alternatively, the PCAOB should adopt the IAASB/ASB standards.  Either approach utilizes the expertise not currently resident in the PCAOB and reduces the complexity and number of standards a firm must follow in conducting a quality audit.
      • Although the AICPA peer inspection process has weaknesses, it leverages industry and technical expertise that is currently lacking in the PCAOB process.   The authors recommend a “peer enhanced” federal inspection.  With direction and scope provided by the PCAOB, and inspections by industry expert peers, the inspections would improve at a reduced PCAOB cost.
      • Transparency should be a priority of the PCAOB in standard-setting as well as reporting of inspection findings.  In addition, a resolution process should be implemented so disputes between the inspection team and the firm can be resolved.
    Citation:

    Glover, S.M., D. F. Prawitt, and M. H. Taylor. 2009. Auditor standard setting and inspection for U.S. public companies:  A critical assessment and recommendations for fundamental change.  Accounting Horizons 23 (2): 221-237.

    Keywords:
    auditing standards, PCAOB
    Purpose of the Study:

    The purpose of this study is to provide commentary on the PCAOB’s ability to achieve its mission given its standard-setting and inspection models, incentives, organizational composition, and structure. The authors also provide recommendations to policy makers, regulators and leaders in the accounting and audit profession in developing improved approaches to audit standard-setting, inspection and enforcement.

    Design/Method/ Approach:

    This paper is structured as a commentary organized under the following sections: auditing standards, inspection and enforcement, and recommendations to improve standard-setting and inspection.

    Findings:

    As this paper is a commentary, there are no findings.  The summary of discussion points is included below.

    Category:
    Standard Setting
    Sub-category:
    Impact of SOX, Impact of PCAOB
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  • The Auditing Section
    PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms: Initial Evidence...
    research summary posted April 13, 2012 by The Auditing Section, tagged 01.0 Standard Setting, 01.06 Impact of PCAOB, 11.0 Audit Quality and Quality Control, 11.11 Impact of Firm and External Inspection Programs 
    Title:
    PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms: Initial Evidence from Inspection Reports
    Practical Implications:

    This study provides a detailed analysis of the deficiencies identified in the PCAOB inspections of small firms, including an examination of firm-specific characteristics. It also provides insights into the PCAOB’s inspection practices, which is useful for regulators, audit firms, public companies and financial statement users to consider.

     

    Citation:

    Hermanson, D. R., R. W. Houston, and J. C. Rice. 2007. PCAOB Inspections of Smaller CPA Firms: Initial Evidence from Inspection Reports.  Accounting Horizons 21 (2):  137-152. 

    Keywords:
    PCAOB inspections, inspection reports, audit quality, quality control
    Purpose of the Study:

    In accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, the PCAOB conducts periodic inspections of member firms. Firms with over 100 issuer clients are inspected annually, while firms with 100 or fewer issuers are inspected at least every three years. Inspection results for the large firms have been well-documented and publicized, however very little is known about the PCAOB inspections of the small firms. This study analyzes the PCAOB inspection reports for registered accounting firms with 100 or fewer issuer clients to determine whether: 

    •  There is an association between inspection process characteristics and the identified deficiencies. 
    •  There is an association between audit firm characteristics and the identified deficiencies.
    •  There is an association between audit firm characteristics and the year of the inspection (all inspections were conducted in either 2004 or 2005).
    •  There is an association between client portfolio characteristics and the identified deficiencies.
    •  Certain specific audit deficiencies are cited by the PCAOB more than others.
    Design/Method/ Approach:

    The authors gather data from 316 PCAOB inspections of smaller accounting firms (i.e. firms that audit 100 or fewer issuers annually) through July 13, 2006. All inspection data are gathered from the PCAOB’s website and supplemented with data from Audit Analytics. Descriptive analyses on the 189 inspection reports that have audit deficiencies are compared and contrasted with that of the 127 inspection reports without deficiencies.    

    Findings:
    • The length of the inspection (days spent on site) and the report lag (months from completion of the inspection to issuance of the report) are greater for firms with deficiencies.
    • Audit firms with deficiencies are smaller (fewer professionals), have a greater number of issuer clients despite their smaller size, and are growing faster than no-deficiency firms.
    • Audit firms inspected in 2004 are significantly more likely to have deficiencies identified than those inspected in 2005.
    • The PCAOB’s 2004 inspections appear to be focused on smaller, riskier, rapidly growing audit firms.
    • Clients of deficiency firms are smaller, less profitable, and more highly leveraged, suggesting greater risk.
    • Deficiencies are overwhelmingly related to the substantive procedures performed by the audit firms (e.g. failure to perform and document various analyses and procedures)
    • The most commonly cited accounting issues listed in the deficiencies are associated with revenues, receivables, equity, and liabilities

    The authors suggest that their findings provide a caution to smaller audit firms, who have perhaps over-extended themselves, and sacrificed audit quality by serving too many issuer clients. They argue that small firms should carefully consider the costs and benefits of serving multiple issuer clients.  

    Category:
    Standard Setting, Audit Quality & Quality Control
    Sub-category:
    Impact of PCAOB, Impact of Firm & External Inspection Programs
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