At its core, the theory proposed by the authors assumes that auditors are economic agents who provide a valuable service and can be expected to behave rationally to maximize their profits. Strategic behaviors such as under-auditing, over-auditing, or overbilling would be unobservable by an auditee in many instances. The possibility of such behaviors has important implications for the level of assurance over financial reports and can potentially affect the efficient allocation of capital resources. One of the goals of this study was to analyze how the credence aspect of audits could influence important policy decisions. Regulation may play a powerful role in mitigating the credence nature of auditing, e.g., PCAOB inspections. However, regulation can be a double-edged sword if it increases the incentive or opportunity for auditors to behave strategically. Therefore, auditors can take the theories and models presented in this study to evaluate their firms for potential profit maximizing biases that may negatively impact audit quality and efficiency. Policy makers could also use these theories and models to evaluate how new auditing policies might influence auditors’ incentives and behaviors.

For more information on this study, please contact W. Robert Knechel.
 

Causholli, M., and W. R. Knechel. 2012. An Examination of the Credence Attributes of an Audit. Accounting Horizons 26(4): 631-656.

The purpose of this study was to expand the understanding of the economics of auditing and audit markets by using the theory of credence goods as the basis for explaining auditors’ incentives. The idea of a credence good or service is that (1) the seller of the good or service is an expert who both recommends and provides a level of service to the buyer; (2) buyers of credence goods or services cannot assess how a service is a delivered and must rely on a seller’s recommendation; and (3) buyers cannot assess how well the service was performed. The authors suggest that the external audit is a credence good which provides auditors with incentives to under-audit, over-audit or overcharge their clients.

The authors take a purely theoretical approach to study the perspective of an audit as a credence good. The authors rely on prior research of credence goods and on the principles of Game Theory to help explain auditors’ incentives to under-audit, over-audit or overcharge clients and predict auditors’ behaviors under certain scenarios. The authors use theoretical decision trees to describe an auditor’s possible strategies for bidding for an audit, and for executing the audit. The authors also describe examples of prior auditing research that present results that support the author’s credence theory.

    The authors propose that if an audit is a credence good, the auditee cannot determine any of the levels of audit effort that define the auditor’s decisions. This creates information asymmetry between the auditor and auditee both before and after the audit because the auditee cannot be sure of the true level of assurance that is necessary before the audit, and the auditee cannot be sure of the true level of assurance that is gained as a consequence of the audit. The information asymmetry goes in favor of the auditor, who can act strategically to under-audit and earn greater profits because the auditee has imperfect information about the auditor’s work and the level of assurance gained by the auditor’s efforts.

 The authors also propose that there are disciplining mechanisms in the market for audit services that are in place to mitigate an auditor’s incentive to behave strategically such as an auditee’s direct knowledge, audit firm reputation and size, professional regulation, legal liability, and competition between audit firms. However, while these mechanisms may be in place, an auditor facing low penalties or risk of detection may be more likely to consider strategic actions. In environments with weak courts or regulation, auditors have more incentives to act strategically and expect to reap superior profits as a result. Similarly, changes in regulations or other structural changes in the audit market can induce changes in the incentives for auditors to behave strategically. Overall, disciplining mechanisms facilitate the operation of audit markets even though they may not completely resolve the information (credence) problem.
 

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Prior research suggests that the length of auditor-client relationship affects audit quality, and, therefore, the integrity and information risk associated with a clients’ financial reporting. This study attempts to examine the effects of audit engagement partner tenure and rotation on investors’ perceptions. The results of this study raise important questions for future research. It is not known to what extent investors or analysts are aware of the audit partner’s identity or pay attention to audit partner tenure. If investors or analysts do not consider partner tenure, future research may identify omitted variables that have the same nonlinear relationship with the ex ante cost of capital that we observe for non-Big 4 audit partner tenure.  

Azizkhani, M., G. S. Monroe, and G. Shailer. 2013. Audit Partner Tenure and Cost of Equity Capital. Auditing 32 (1).

Recent proposals by the PCAOB suggest that audit firms should be required to identify the name of the engagement partner in the audit report. The proposals suggest that this provides useful information to investors by allowing investors to identify audit partner tenure and rotation. Professional accounting bodies and regulators have long been concerned that long auditor-client relationships impair audit quality. The PCAOB, however, has noted that other commenters do not believe disclosure of partner identity will provide meaningful information to investors. This study investigates the usefulness of disclosing partner identity by exploring whether audit partner tenure and partner rotation are informative to investors, as indicated by the ex ante cost of equity capital.

The authors tested the relationship between client-specific ex ante cost of equity capital and audit partner tenure using two models. The client-specific ex ante cost of equity capital was estimated using the price-earnings ratio divided by the short-term earnings growth rate. Auditor tenure was tested using raw, long transform, and quadratic terms. The authors also used two-stage regressions to address the potential for Big 4 selection bias. The sample was selected for all Australian-domiciled companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during the 1995-2005 time period. 

• Partner tenure has a nonlinear relation with the ex ante cost of equity capital for non-Big 4 audit engagements prior to the introduction of partner rotation requirements.
• Imputed gains from partner tenure appear similar to the imputed gains of having a Big 4 auditor.
• Partner rotation is associated with increased ex ante cost of equity capital.  

The availability of Big Data will precipitate substantive changes in accounting education, research, and practice. In education, in particular accounting and auditing, the use of Big Data will increase the statistical and IT content in curricula, probably breaking the current set of limitations represented in the CPA exam. Research in the more traditional fields in accounting, such as capital markets research, will benefit from dimensional increases in data availability and will be conditional on improvements of the researcher’s skill sets in areas such as modeling, statistics, and text mining. Practice, in particular internal audit departments, will be the leading facilitator of accounting Big Data usage, while attempting to keep abreast or in sync with the developments in corporate data utilization in fields like marketing, supply chain, and customer services.

Vasarhelyi, M. A., A. Kogan, and B. M. Tuttle. 2015. Big Data in Accounting: An Overview. Accounting Horizons 29 (2): 381-396.

The term Big Data is fairly new but seems to be applied in almost every area of human activity at the moment. It is not defined in the rigorous meaning of the word, and it is usually used under the assumption that the readers understand it at the intuitive level. The reason for this popularity is the exponentially growing amount of information made available by developments in computing and telecommunications technology, particularly the Internet and environmental sensing. This paper sheds light on the meaning of Big Data in the accounting and auditing domains.

This article is a commentary.

• The definition of Big Data is conditional on the environment being used.
• Processing needs are nonlinear with the size of data. Even small datasets may be computationally difficult if models are complex.
• There is a progressive extension of the feasible dataset. Inclusion of sources is mainly an economic and legal issue and not one of feasibility.
• Newly included data structures contain a wide set of not previously determined/used parameters, which by themselves may be informational.
• Extended, nontraditional data sources may substantively change the domains of accounting and auditing.
• Linkages of traditional extended data, as found in ERPs, to new sources of data may provide very strong confirmatory evidence for economic activity.
• Accounting, auditing, and management extensions into Big Data usage overlap and present powerful opportunities in the next decade but also the re-conceptualization of functions in an age of computer intelligence and automation.

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In light of cost reductions in data generation, storage, retrieval, and transmission, the inherent compromises within the paper paradigm are of little benefit. Users are entitled to more in-depth, granular values that they can manipulate, drilling down and up for more or less detail where needed. Financial reporting standards that govern presentation and arbitrary aggregation must likewise give way to rules regarding the limits and frequency of data transmission, as well as the quality of those data. 

Audit standards must change as well. Error detection and risk quantification are no longer sufficient targets, but must be seen as small components of an audit of broader scope. The deep analysis of tremendous volumes of data and potentially thousands of exception reports necessitates a different paradigm of reporting and assurance. The role of auditing standards, far from being diminished in the face of increasing automation, must shift from governing sampling procedures to embracing the broader, deeper data availability and analysis of the modern era in an effort to create a better, more thorough audit.

Krahel, J. P., and W. R. Titera. 2015. Consequences of Big Data and Formalization on Accounting and Auditing Standards. Accounting Horizons 29 (2): 409-422.

The level, breadth, and quality of externally presented financial information have always represented a compromise between the preparer’s cost and the user’s benefit. While preparer costs vis-a`-vis data collection and transmission have decreased significantly, the compromises made in the paper-based era have persisted, creating a set of anachronistic accounting practices that, in the authors’ view, unfairly handicaps statement users. A similar effect can be observed in auditing practices. While data availability and standardization have increased, audit standards continue to focus on sampling and other practices indicative of a low-information environment. This paper will address the problems that result from such anachronisms, present a set of axes along which accounting and auditing standards must evolve, describe the avenues through which such changes can be accomplished, and discuss the new paradigm from academic and practical perspectives.

This article is a commentary.

• Accounting and reporting standards must adapt to deal with the frequent (possibly even continuous) transmission of granular data, not only their presentation in the aggregate.
• Such standards need to consider addressing company-specific data, as well as macro-level data that may be important to the analysis of a company’s financial condition. They also need to consider enhancing historical reporting to include other data elements that may enable predictive analysis by users.
• Auditing standards must address situations where data are abundant, not only where data are sparse. The concept of materiality in relation to a company’s financial statements, taken as a whole, needs to be reevaluated.
• Auditing standards must also do more to address the concept of process auditing. When data are available on a continuous basis, the processes generating those data must be continuously assured. Internal and external auditor competencies must be broadened to include more advanced types of data analytics. 
• All parties along the financial reporting value chain must recognize the latent value in unstructured and semi-structured data.
• Care must be taken to minimize the expectations gap between users and auditors in the face of increasing data and analytical capacity. A user’s role (and responsibility), which could change, must also be considered.

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This discussion emphasizes significant caution when interpreting the results of the study. Mainly, it is unclear if results of the study can generalize to the broader public company market in the US. Furthermore, if the results are misinterpreted (i.e., individual auditors are not systematically aggressive but, instead, high quality auditors are systematically assigned the riskiest clients) then regulation requiring audit partner identification could actually have overall negative effects on overall audit quality.

Kinney, W.R. 2015. Discussion of “Does the Identity of Engagement Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions”. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (4):1479-1488.

The author reviews the paper's content, analyzes its predictive validity, and discusses its multiple implications. He provides constructive suggestions for improvements. Based on predictive validity analysis, the author concludes that engagement partner assignment strategy is an important and acknowledged omitted variable that affects the study's internal validity via both the independent variable (partner's prior performance measure) and the dependent variable (borrower's cost of debt capital). The omission also affects construct validities and, if audit firms are applying a plausible assignment strategy, then interpretation of the study's main results would be reversed. Finally, the lack of a standards intervention noted by the authors and the extreme size and other differences between audits of Swedish private companies and U.S. public companies impair external validity and generalization to the U.S. intervention.

This article is a discussion.

The discussion emphasizes the following points:

• KVZ (the reviewed paper’s authors Knechel, Vanstraelen and Zerni) main analyses are for statutory (not financial statement) audits of small, private, Swedish companies. Therefore, these results may have more limited generalizability. 
• KVZ use publically available data for private companies without considering the significant amount of private information available to private lenders and audit firms.
• KVZ acknowledge and cannot rule out a potential competing hypothesis whereby audit firms follow a “best partner to riskiest engagements” strategy. In this case, the highest quality partners may appear to have the most aggressive reporting strategy because that partner serves riskier clients with harder to predict bankruptcy risk. To confirm/disconfirm this competing hypothesis occurs, KVZ could ask audit firm management to describe their audit partner assignment strategies and rank a sample of partners accordingly. This information could be correlated with KVZ’s reporting style measures.    
• Regulators, academics, and popular/business press articles may be similarly over-generalizing KVZ’s results. Furthermore, misinterpretation of results could have the ill-effects of high quality audit partners being assessed as low quality. This false characterization may lead high quality auditors to refuse to audit riskier clients where their skills are most needed. As such, any interpretations of KVZ’s results should proceed with much caution.

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