The results suggest that fees paid to auditors, even for non-audit services, can potentially threaten auditor independence, particularly among banks that are not subject to the same level of regulatory scrutiny as large banks.

Kanagaretnam, K., G. V. Krishnan, and G. J. Lobo. 2010. An Empirical Analysis of Auditor Independence in the Banking Industry. The Accounting Review 85 (6): 2011-2046.

 Lowballing has been cited as a threat to auditor independence and manager performance in regulatory reports and academic research. This study suggests that auditors may face independence issues at the beginning of a client relationship under the lowballing fee structure because of the uncertainty of retaining a client. The study also suggests, however, that these independence issues seem to dissipate over time. Therefore, auditors should be aware of these potential opportunities to lose objectivity when they acquire new audit clients and continue to rely on professional skepticism to evaluate management assertions.

For more information on this study, please contact Darius J. Fatemi.
 

Fatemi, D. J. 2012. An Experimental Investigation of the Influence of Audit Fee Structure and Auditor Selection Rights on Auditor Independence and Client Investment Decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 31(3): 75-94.

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The finding of this study suggest that concerns over the relation between auditor fees and the possible impairment of auditor independence, as reflected in going concern modification decisions, are supported in the more recent years for highly distressed clients. The relationship between auditor fees and impairment of auditor independence with respect to auditor decision-making has long been a concern of many regulators in the accounting industry. This research may inform both audit firms and standard setters with respect to specific types of engagements and the judgments or behaviors most likely to be affected.

For more information on this study, please contact Allen D. Blay.
 

Blay, A. D., and M. A. Geiger. 2013. Auditor Fees and Auditor Independence: Evidence from Going Concern Reporting Decisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (2).

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This study uses engagement-level audit partner data, to analyze whether audit quality is driven by client importance at the office- or partner-level.  Overall, the results contribute to evidence showing that investor protection rules and laws at the country-level are associated with engagement-level audit quality.  This indicates the importance of strong investor protection regulations.  These results may be of interest to shareholders and securities market regulators, especially in developing economies, transitional economies, or economies where such regulations are weak.  Additionally, these results may be of interests to auditors in countries with such economies.  Finally, to the extent that audit firms serve clients with investors that receive varying levels of protection (i.e. public vs. private or a “well-known seasoned issuer”), these results may indicate opportunities for such firms to enhance audit requirements for certain non-public engagements. 

The results of this study also suggest that audit accountability at the individual level makes auditors more sensitive to the costs of audit failure.  This result may have implications for auditor accountability from a regulatory standpoint, as well as an audit firm policy standpoint.

Chen, S., S. Y. J. Sun, and D. Wu. 2010. Client Importance, Institutional Improvements, and Audit Quality in China: An Office and Individual Auditor Level Analysis. The Accounting Review 85 (1): 127-158.

This research note presents evidence that the question of whether new standards or regulations have achieved the objective of altering the behavior of their intended target cannot be adequately assessed shortly after they have come into effect, as the implementation often requires a steep learning curve and is frequently accompanied by intense public debates and media scrutiny. From the policy standpoint, it suggests that the concern expressed by the U.S, Treasury Department officials about auditors’ applying an overly strict approach in their audits to counter elevated liability after SOX may not be warranted.

For more information on this study, please contact Wenjun Zhang.

Kao, J. L., Y. Li., and W. Zhang. 2014. Did SOX influence the association between fee dependence and auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern opinions? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 33 (2): 165-185

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