This study provides policy-makers and practitioners with critical insight into differences in auditor selection criteria between family and non-family firms and differences in the severity of their agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and also between family owners and minority shareholders.
Our empirical evidence also sheds light on how family firms view and value the external audit and whether they are selecting auditors on price or quality, or some combination of these factors. In addition, given the current downward trend in audit revenues as a percentage of total revenues, our findings could lead accounting firms to re-examine how they market audit services to family firms.
Ho, J.L., and F.Kang. 2013.Auditor Choice and Audit Fees in Family Firms: Evidence from the S&P 1500.Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory32(4): 71-93
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The results of this study suggest that companies who offer incentive-based compensation to chief internal auditors, especially through equity, are more likely to be perceived as having a higher audit risk by external auditors. Consequently, external auditors may charge a higher fee for their services. This study gives a basis for the benefit/cost analysis of providing incentive-based compensation for chief internal auditors. While it is possible internal auditors will respond positively to an IBC and bring extra value to the organization, there is a risk that an external auditor could raise audit fees cancelling out this added benefit.
Chen, Lucy Huajing, H. H. Chung, G. F. Peters., and J. P. Wynn. (Jeannie).2017. Does Incentive-Based Compensation for Chief Internal Auditors Impact Objectivity? An External Audit Risk Perspective. Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory 36 (21): 21-44
This paper synthesizes many theories of institutional experimentation and identifies work for advancing the understanding of commercialism in the accounting profession. It also contributes through the explication of identity experimentation as a key mechanism used by the accounting profession to institutionalize commercialism. The paper works to demarcate boundary work and practice work as two different types of identity experimentation. Finally, the paper delineates the difference between deriving an auditor identity from audit practice and deriving expert work from a versatile expert identity.
Guo, K. 2016. The Institutionalization of Commercialism in the Accounting Profession: An Identity-Experimentation Perspective. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (3): 99-118.
The study provides useful insight into current regulatory debates on the auditor’s economic dependence on the client and increases understanding to the reasons why previous research provides mixed evidence on the association between various fee metrics and the extent of earnings management. If the association between abnormal fees and the magnitude of discretionary accruals is conditioned on the sign of abnormal fees, examining the association without reference to the sign of abnormal fees most likely leads to observations of insignificant associations, as also reported in most previous studies. This study’s findings suggest that future research on similar issues should take into account the asymmetric nonlinearity in the fee-quality relation.
Choi, J. H., J. B. Kim, and Y. Zang. 2010. Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality? Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29 (2): 115-140.
The results of this study shed light on the complex interplay between analyst following, the pressure that managers face to manage earnings, the pressure that auditors face to protect their reputations in the post-SOX environment, and the important role that audit committees can play in settings in which managers may act strategically to achieve desired financial reporting outcomes.
Keune, M. B., and K. M. Johnstone. 2012. Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees. Accounting Review 87 (5): 1641-1677.
The study results are important to regulators and audit practitioners as they show the consequences of initial year audit fee low-balling on the performance of the audit. Lower audit quality occurs when an audit firm change includes a change to both audit partners along with a reduction in audit fees. This indicates that retaining one or both of the former audit partners in the new audit firm can offset the reduced audit quality effect in the initial years of the audit engagement.
Huang, H.-W., K. Raghunandan, T.-C. Huang, and J.-R. Chiou. 2015. Fee Discounting and Audit Quality Following Audit Firm and Audit Partner Changes: Chinese Evidence. The Accounting Review 90 (4): 1517–1546.
This study sheds light on what underlies decision making in the imperative audit committee responsibility of auditor appointment: nuanced interactions and power asymmetry among management, the audit committee, and auditors. The auditors viewed the CFO as the client and tailored the proposal accordingly. The audit committee will not be effective unless both auditors and audit committee members fundamentally change their mindsets about their respective roles in relation to client management. As large public companies employ multiple Big 4 firm, the viability of severing existing relationships to bring in a truly independent auditor mindset through audit firm rotation is questionable.
Fiolleau, K., Hoang, K., Jamal, K., & Sunder, S. 2013. How Do Regulatory Reforms to Enhance Auditor Independence Work in Practice? Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (3): 864-890.
These findings add to the understanding of how accountants respond to ethical tones at all levels within their organization and provide important evidence that the tone at the bottom is a key determinant, more so than tone at the top, of the ethical decision making of staff auditors. This study provides important insights into how ethical tone at multiple levels of an organization impacts entry-level employees’ ethical decision making. By recognizing the important role that immediate supervisors play in influencing their subordinates, organizations can more effectively promote an ethical culture at all levels of the organization and not simply at the top.
Pickerd, J. S., Summers, S. L., & Wood, D. A. 2015. An Examination of How Entry-Level Staff Auditors Respond to Tone at the Top vis-a`-vis Tone at the Bottom. Behavioral Research in Accounting 27 (1): 79-98.
This research note presents evidence that the question of whether new standards or regulations have achieved the objective of altering the behavior of their intended target cannot be adequately assessed shortly after they have come into effect, as the implementation often requires a steep learning curve and is frequently accompanied by intense public debates and media scrutiny. From the policy standpoint, it suggests that the concern expressed by the U.S, Treasury Department officials about auditors’ applying an overly strict approach in their audits to counter elevated liability after SOX may not be warranted.
For more information on this study, please contact Wenjun Zhang.
Kao, J. L., Y. Li., and W. Zhang. 2014. Did SOX influence the association between fee dependence and auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern opinions? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 33 (2): 165-185
The finding of this study suggest that concerns over the relation between auditor fees and the possible impairment of auditor independence, as reflected in going concern modification decisions, are supported in the more recent years for highly distressed clients. The relationship between auditor fees and impairment of auditor independence with respect to auditor decision-making has long been a concern of many regulators in the accounting industry. This research may inform both audit firms and standard setters with respect to specific types of engagements and the judgments or behaviors most likely to be affected.
For more information on this study, please contact Allen D. Blay.
Blay, A. D., and M. A. Geiger. 2013. Auditor Fees and Auditor Independence: Evidence from Going Concern Reporting Decisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (2).