The results of the study have important implications for regulators, auditors, and companies. In recent years, audit partner rotation has increased due to mandatory rotation legislation in Australia and has led to increased monetary and social costs. This study identifies the extent to which auditors pass on these costs and the relative bargaining power between an audit firm and a client, which varies across different segments of the market. This study also makes several contributions to existing literature. Specifically, this study informs the debate on the costs and benefits of audit partner rotation by focusing on the financial costs of partner rotation in the form of increased audit fees. Further, this study extends prior research that examines the impact of mandatory and voluntary partner rotation and the association between audit fees and partner rotation in different market segments. In addition, this study informs policy makers and regulators on whether and in which context the costs of audit partner rotation are passed on to clients as increased audit fees.
Stewart, J., P. Kent and J. Routledge. 2016. The Association Between Audit Partner Rotation and Audit Fees: Empirical Evidence from the Australian Market. Auditing, A Journal of Practice and Theory 35 (2): 181-197.
The costs and benefits of SOX have been researched by numerous authors, however the benefits outside of the United States have generally been limited to those of firms that are listed on U.S. exchanges. The authors observe improvements in earnings quality for subsidiaries of U.S. firms which file financial reports in Belgium, suggesting that there is a spillover effect of SOX compliance outside of domestic firms. The authors caveat that they cannot determine if the results are driven by improved internal controls or improved audit quality of the parent company, but they show improvement in foreign-filing earnings in spite of these financial reports being generated outside of the U.S. reporting process.
Dutillieux, W., J.R. Francis, M. Willekens. 2016. The Spillover of SOX on Earnings Quality in Non-U.S. Jurisdictions. Accounting Horizons 30 (1): 23-39.
The findings support the regulators’ contention that the new top-down, risk-based approach under AS5 makes the audit process timelier and efficient by decreasing audit report lags and facilitating firms’ efforts to meet the reporting deadline set by the SEC, especially when the firms have an effective internal control system. However, the firms with material internal control problems that persist either at the company level or at the accounts/transaction level continue to experience larger reporting lags in the post-AS5 years compared with the clean SOX 404 firms. The results are generally consistent with auditors focusing more on critical risk areas associated with ineffective internal controls and applying principle-oriented top-down, risk-based audit procedures to minimize risk, which requires increased audit efforts and longer audit time to accomplish their work properly.
Mitra, S., H. Song, and J. S. Yang. 2015. The Effect of Auditing Standard No. 5 on Audit Report Lags. Accounting Horizons 29 (3): 507-527.
The results suggest that viewing the impact of SOX as occurring only once, ignoring either the costs due to the independence requirements or the later impact of Section 404 internal control provisions, and failure to control adequately for business complexity, may have resulted in the prior studies underestimating the effect of SOX on audit and audit related fees.
Shaw, W. H., and W. D. Terando. 2014. The Cost of Compliance to Sarbanes-Oxley: An Examination of the Real Estate Investment Industry. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33 (1): 177-186.
These findings should be of interest to regulators (e.g., ACAP and Department of Treasury) that have focused efforts on assessing the sustainability of the audit profession. However, the results can be viewed as good news in terms of the overall risk level of the Big 4 client portfolio, but possibly as bad news if regulators believe the Big 4 firms are the most qualified to provide audit services to riskier clients and should not use market forces as an excuse to shed or avoid these riskiest clients.
Schroeder, J. H., and C. E. Hogan. 2013. The Impact of PCAOB AS5 and the Economic Recession on Client Portfolio Characteristics of the Big 4 Audit Firms. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 32 (4): 95-127.
The study offers two primary contributions. First, it provides insight into the incentive effect of corporate insider trading on auditor behavior. The study helps to fill this gap by providing evidence on the relationship between managers’ incentives and auditors’ opinions. Second, this study adds to the literature on insider trading. The evidence extends this literature by showing that insiders’ incentives to sell and their desire to avoid litigation can influence auditors’ reports.
Chen, C., X. Martin, and X. Wang. 2013. Insider Trading, Litigation Concerns, and Auditor Going-Concern Opinions. Accounting Review 88 (2): 365-393.
This study contributes to existing literature by re-examining the relationship between audit committee compensation and financial reporting quality. The findings indicate the continuance of a negative relationship between audit committee members’ stock-option compensation and financial reporting quality in the post-SOX era. These results are relevant to regulators, compensation committees, and auditors because they imply that shifting audit committee director compensation away from stock options has the potential to improve financial reporting quality.
Campbell, J. L., J. Hansen, C. A. Simon, and J. L. Smith. 2015. Audit Committee Stock Options and Financial Reporting Quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 34 (2):91-120.
The results emphasize the importance of the composition of the compensation committee. Specifically, results suggest that boards should consider appointing financial experts to serve not only on the audit committee but also on the compensation committee, as it would improve the oversight of the CFO. The results reveal that CFOs are held accountable not only for their managerial duties as reflected in firm financial performance, but also for their fiduciary duties associated with accurate financial reporting and high-quality internal controls.
Hoitash, R., Hoitash, U., & Johnstone, K. M. 2012. Internal Control Material Weaknesses and CFO Compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 768-803.
The results carry important implications for regulators, investors, and researchers. The findings suggest both firm-level corporate governance and home country investor protection still matter in explaining the disclosure behavior of cross-listed firms. Hence, it may be warranted for U.S. securities regulators to devote more resources to monitoring the financial disclosure quality of CONTROL_WEDGE firms from weak investor protection countries. The results suggest that U.S. investors should pay closer attention to the financial disclosure quality of cross-listed firms, especially CONTROL_WEDGE firms from weak investor protection countries. This is important because the recent accounting frauds involving cross-listed firms suggest that U.S. investors might not have paid sufficient attention to the disclosure quality, and as a result suffered significant economic losses after the revelation of the accounting frauds.
Gong, G., Ke, B., & Yu, Y. 2013. Home Country Investor Protection, Ownership Structure and Cross-Listed Firms' Compliance with SOX-Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures. Contemporary Accounting Research 30 (4): 1490-1523.
The results demonstrate a demand for IC audits such that, even in the presence of increased manager liability, the IC audit incrementally motivates managers to spend on improving IC and to provide more consistent and accurate ICFR disclosures. Unlike managers, investors react as though manager liability and IC audits are substitutes. This finding has implications for policymakers as it demonstrates the need to consider the possible differing effects of regulation on managers and investors. Moreover, with respect to regulatory actions to simultaneously implement both manager liability and an IC audit, the results suggest that both mechanisms may not be necessary to improve investors’ confidence and in turn market prices.
Wu, Y., & Tuttle, B. 2014. The Interactive Effects of Internal Control Audits and Manager Legal Liability on Managers' Internal Controls Decisions, Investor Confidence, and Market Prices. Contemporary Accounting Research 31 (2): 444-468.