The costs and benefits of SOX have been researched by numerous authors, however the benefits outside of the United States have generally been limited to those of firms that are listed on U.S. exchanges. The authors observe improvements in earnings quality for subsidiaries of U.S. firms which file financial reports in Belgium, suggesting that there is a spillover effect of SOX compliance outside of domestic firms. The authors caveat that they cannot determine if the results are driven by improved internal controls or improved audit quality of the parent company, but they show improvement in foreign-filing earnings in spite of these financial reports being generated outside of the U.S. reporting process.

Dutillieux, W., J.R. Francis, M. Willekens. 2016. The Spillover of SOX on Earnings Quality in Non-U.S. Jurisdictions. Accounting Horizons 30 (1): 23-39.

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The results suggest that viewing the impact of SOX as occurring only once, ignoring either the costs due to the independence requirements or the later impact of Section 404 internal control provisions, and failure to control adequately for business complexity, may have resulted in the prior studies underestimating the effect of SOX on audit and audit related fees.

Shaw, W. H., and W. D. Terando. 2014. The Cost of Compliance to Sarbanes-Oxley: An Examination of the Real Estate Investment Industry. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 33 (1): 177-186.

The study offers two primary contributions. First, it provides insight into the incentive effect of corporate insider trading on auditor behavior. The study helps to fill this gap by providing evidence on the relationship between managers’ incentives and auditors’ opinions. Second, this study adds to the literature on insider trading. The evidence extends this literature by showing that insiders’ incentives to sell and their desire to avoid litigation can influence auditors’ reports.

Chen, C., X. Martin, and X. Wang. 2013. Insider Trading, Litigation Concerns, and Auditor Going-Concern Opinions. Accounting Review 88 (2): 365-393.

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The results emphasize the importance of the composition of the compensation committee. Specifically, results suggest that boards should consider appointing financial experts to serve not only on the audit committee but also on the compensation committee, as it would improve the oversight of the CFO. The results reveal that CFOs are held accountable not only for their managerial duties as reflected in firm financial performance, but also for their fiduciary duties associated with accurate financial reporting and high-quality internal controls.

Hoitash, R., Hoitash, U., & Johnstone, K. M. 2012. Internal Control Material Weaknesses and CFO Compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 29 (3): 768-803.

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The results demonstrate a demand for IC audits such that, even in the presence of increased manager liability, the IC audit incrementally motivates managers to spend on improving IC and to provide more consistent and accurate ICFR disclosures. Unlike managers, investors react as though manager liability and IC audits are substitutes. This finding has implications for policymakers as it demonstrates the need to consider the possible differing effects of regulation on managers and investors. Moreover, with respect to regulatory actions to simultaneously implement both manager liability and an IC audit, the results suggest that both mechanisms may not be necessary to improve investors’ confidence and in turn market prices.

Wu, Y., & Tuttle, B. 2014. The Interactive Effects of Internal Control Audits and Manager Legal Liability on Managers' Internal Controls Decisions, Investor Confidence, and Market Prices. Contemporary Accounting Research 31 (2): 444-468.

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